

# NO ESCAPE:

Assessing the relationship between slavery-related abuse and internal displacement in Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo



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Cover photo: A man rides a bicycle inside a displacement camp in North-east Nigeria, February 2019. The ongoing Boko Haram insurgency has driven widespread displacement across the north-east. By the end of 2020, there were more than 2.7 million IDPs in Nigeria who had been displaced due to conflict and violence. Photo credit: Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images

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
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# Key Findings

Surveys on recent experiences\* of slavery-related abuse were conducted among IDPs residing in displacement sites in North Kivu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and North-east Nigeria.

\*Those that occurred in the five years before the time of interview



## Recent experiences of slavery-related abuse were common among IDPs. These abuses occurred before, during and after displacement.

IDPs surveyed who experienced forced labour, forced recruitment and abductions in the previous five years.


**1 in 5\***  
NORTH KIVU,  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
OF THE CONGO



**1 in 20**  
SOUTH SUDAN




**1 in 60**  
NORTH-EAST NIGERIA



\*Among the sample of IDPs in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

## Slavery-related abuses were linked to conflict


IDPs who experienced forced labour during the reference period.



\*As a proportion of the sample

## Slavery-related abuses were characteristically violent

IDPs who were unable to refuse or leave because of violence (including sexual) and threats of violence.




\*As a proportion of sampled individuals

## Displacement sites did not always offer protection from slavery-related abuse


### SOUTH SUDAN

Slavery-related abuses occurring after displacement



### NORTH KIVU, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Slavery-related abuse commenced while living in a displacement site



### NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

Similar analysis could not be performed for North-east Nigeria due to small case numbers.

# Executive Summary

Amid a global response to the devastating economic and health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, humanitarian needs are acute. Despite a dramatic decrease in international mobility due to the pandemic, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) reached new heights.<sup>1</sup> By the end of 2020, there were 48 million people across 59 countries and territories who were internally displaced due to conflict and violence. The economic cost of displacement for the year, including the cost of disruptions to income as well as that of providing accommodation, education, health, and security to IDPs, totalled almost USD 20.5 billion.<sup>2</sup>

Displacement and forced migration have devastating impacts on the human rights of individuals and communities. There is a growing understanding that conflict and displacement increases vulnerability to forms of slavery-related abuse, including forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and armed forces, forced marriage, abduction, and human trafficking.<sup>3</sup> In recent years this issue has received increased attention internationally and wide acknowledgement that it warrants urgent attention.<sup>4</sup> Despite this recognition, few organizations have sought to quantify slavery-related abuse among persons displaced by conflict. Without such data, it is difficult to accurately allocate resources and formulate policies to remedy these abuses.

To address this data shortage, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Walk Free conducted a study to estimate the prevalence of slavery-related abuse among people who experienced displacement in three countries – Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – each of which has endured protracted conflict that continues to uproot people and force them to seek refuge largely in camps, camp-like settings, and in host communities. IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reports approximately 1 million IDPs in North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2.2 million IDPs in the North-east region of Nigeria, and 2 million IDPs across South Sudan.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to estimating prevalence, this study sought to better understand the nature of slavery-related abuse in relation to displacement experiences, and to explore the relationship between individual-level and external factors associated with these forms of slavery-related abuse.

## Methodology

Representative face-to-face household surveys were conducted among IDPs residing in displacement sites in North-east Nigeria, South Sudan, and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, between September 2017 and October 2018. The surveys sought to collect data on recent experiences (those that had occurred in the preceding five-year period) of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and armed forces, abductions, and forced marriage, among primary respondents and their immediate family members.

Multi-stage sampling was implemented to reach a target sample of 2,000 primary respondents in each country. Primary respondents reported on their own experiences in the preceding five years and on the experiences of those in their immediate families (parents, siblings, spouse, and children) over the same period.

In South Sudan, surveys were implemented across five displacement sites in September 2017. The sample consisted of 13,308 individuals, including 1,935 primary respondents.

In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, surveys were implemented between November 2017 and February 2018 across nine of the IOM-coordinated camps and two of the camps coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The sample comprised 15,235 individuals including 2,403 primary respondents.

In North-east Nigeria, surveys were implemented across 77 displacement sites and host communities between July 2018 and October 2018. The sample was made up of 12,422 individuals, including 2,015 primary respondents.

Weights were applied to the South Sudan and Nigeria datasets to improve representativeness of the data and allow the estimates based on data to be generalized to the wider population of IDPs in the types of displacement sites in these countries. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, challenges encountered during data collection meant that unweighted results were presented. For this reason, the Democratic Republic of the Congo dataset cannot be generalized to the IDP population in the country.

To be included in the survey sample, a person had to be displaced at the time of interview. The estimated prevalence rates of slavery-related abuse include anyone in the sample who experienced one or more of the assessed forms of slavery-related abuse during the five-year reference period, regardless of whether or not they were displaced when the abuse occurred. Too few cases of forced marriage and recruitment of child soldiers meant that prevalence estimates could not be reliably calculated for these forms of slavery-related abuse and qualitative analyses are instead presented. Thus, prevalence rates are presented for three forms of slavery-related abuse: forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and armed forces, and abduction.

The three countries included in this study differ from each other in many ways, not least in the context of conflict and displacement. This report was structured with this in mind and does not attempt to draw comparisons between countries. Rather, the study aims to identify common vulnerabilities to slavery-related abuse experienced by communities displaced by conflict, as well as country-specific evidence for policymakers.

## Key Findings

### RECENT EXPERIENCES OF SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE WERE COMMON AMONG DISPLACED PERSONS. THESE ABUSES OCCURRED BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER DISPLACEMENT.

In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, one in five IDPs surveyed had experienced forced labour, forced recruitment, or abduction in the previous five years. In South Sudan, it is estimated that more than one in 20 (5.3%) IDPs in Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites had been subject to one or more forms of slavery-related abuse over the five-year period. In North-east Nigeria, an estimated one in 60 (1.7%) IDPs had experienced one or more forms of slavery-related abuse over the five-year period.

*“When I was taken by Boko Haram, I was forced to engage in fighting. They train us and we were given gun. They have very large farm and they also forced us to work on their farm.”*

MALE RESPONDENT, AGED 45, FROM NORTH-EAST NIGERIA ON HIS EXPERIENCE OF FORCED RECRUITMENT AND FORCED LABOUR

Abductions were the most frequently reported form of slavery-related abuse in both North-east Nigeria and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. In North-east Nigeria, an estimated 1.2 per cent of IDPs living in displacement sites had been abducted during the reference period. In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 14 per cent of sampled IDPs were abducted during the reference period, a rate that was 60 per cent higher than the rate of forced labour and almost five times higher than forced recruitment. In South Sudan, forced recruitment was the most prevalent of the three forms of slavery-related abuse assessed during the five-year period, with 3.1 per cent of IDPs estimated to have experienced forced recruitment into an armed group or the armed forces.

These assessments were based on respondents and their family members who were aged five and above and living at the time of the interview. Therefore, the estimates may be conservative as prevalence rates in the reference period were higher among IDPs who had since died.<sup>6</sup> It is also important to note that findings from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, are not necessarily representative of the wider population of IDPs in displacement sites in the region or country.

### SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE OF THOSE WHO EXPERIENCED DISPLACEMENT WAS INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO THE CONFLICTS IN EACH COUNTRY.

Conflict was the main driver of both displacement and exploitation of IDPs in the displacement sites surveyed in South Sudan, North-east Nigeria, and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. In all three settings, perpetrators of slavery-related abuse were often members of the armed groups and armed forces who would deliberately exploit displaced populations to further their conflict-related operations.

*“On four occasions I was taken to clear the forest next to the military soldiers’ houses and to build their huts. We could not refuse because we would be whipped to death.”*

MALE RESPONDENT, AGED 25, FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ON HIS EXPERIENCE OF FORCED LABOUR



In South Sudan and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, most forced labour activities experienced by IDPs directly supported armed groups and armed forces (63% and 75% respectively), and 60 per cent of situations of forced labour in North-east Nigeria were perpetrated by armed groups and armed forces. Findings also suggest that in South Sudan and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, living in a village that had been attacked prior to displacement was associated with higher odds of slavery-related abuse than living in villages that were not attacked prior to displacement. In South Sudan, those who had lived in a village that had been attacked prior to their displacement faced more than double the odds of forced recruitment into armed groups or forces and abduction than those who had not. In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, those who had lived in a village that was attacked prior to their displacement had 43 per cent greater odds of abduction, 47 per cent greater odds of forced labour, and more than double the odds of forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, compared to those who had not. The recruitment and use of children into armed groups and armed forces was also reported across all three settings, with the majority of child recruits in South Sudan and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, forced to engage in fighting and military service (96% and 76% respectively). Among respondents in North-east Nigeria and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, roughly a quarter (24% and 27% respectively) of forced marriage cases involved force by a member of an armed group.

### **FORCED LABOUR, FORCED RECRUITMENT, AND ABDUCTIONS WERE CHARACTERISTICALLY VIOLENT.**

The use and threat of physical violence were the most common methods of forcing IDPs into situations of slavery-related abuse and of preventing them from leaving exploitative situations. In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 70 per cent of reported forced labour cases and 63 per cent of forced recruitment cases that occurred during the reference period involved violent force. In North-east Nigeria, physical violence was used and threatened in half of forced labour experiences that occurred during the reference period. In South Sudan, physical violence was used to force IDPs to work in 44 per cent of forced labour cases, and as a means of coercion in 44 per cent of child recruitment cases and 16 per cent of forced marriage cases.

*“They often demanded that we transport their property to an unknown destination and if we do not return as soon as we arrive, then they will rape us. I was abducted twice and raped.”*

FEMALE RESPONDENT, AGED 22, FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ON HER ABDUCTION

In all countries, the prevalence of forced recruitment and abductions during the five-year period tended to be higher among those IDPs who had died since their displacement compared with those still living. This may suggest that violent means of coercion often ended in death.

### **CERTAIN CONFLICT-RELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES MAY BE RENDERING IDPS VULNERABLE TO EXPERIENCING FORCED LABOUR, FORCED RECRUITMENT, AND ABDUCTION WHILE THEY ARE AT DISPLACEMENT SITES.**

*“He was taken away by armed forces in his place of displacement in a camp in [Borno state].”*

FEMALE RESPONDENT FROM NORTH-EAST NIGERIA ON THE ABDUCTION OF HER HUSBAND AT AGE 57

In South Sudan and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, there were failures in fully protecting displaced persons in displacement sites from incidents of slavery-related abuse. In South Sudan, more than half (52%) of forced recruitment cases, 61 per cent of abductions, and 21 per cent of forced labour cases had begun after displacement. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, half of respondents who experienced forced labour were in a displacement site when the forced labour began and 47 per cent of primary respondents who had been abducted in the preceding five years had been abducted after displacement. A lack of sufficient data on the timing of slavery-related abuse relative to displacement in North-east Nigeria means that similar analyses cannot be performed there, though it is possible that similar vulnerabilities are experienced in the Nigerian context<sup>7</sup> and further research on this is warranted.

## Limitations

Limitations of the study largely reflect difficulty in accessing the target population and in obtaining accurate accounts of sensitive topics. In all three survey locations, despite careful planning, the volatile security situation hindered access and impacted the ability to reach the target sample for each camp. The safety and security of interviewers and IDPs was of primary concern and on occasions where this could have been compromised, the site visits were cancelled. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this impacted the representativeness of the sample and the ability to draw conclusions about the wider population of IDPs in displacement sites in the country. Research on instances of conflict-related human rights violations, such as forced labour, forced marriage, forced recruitment, abduction, and trafficking in persons, is likely to be under-reported given issues of shame and stigma.

## Recommendations for humanitarian actors

1. Mainstream protection through the lens of slavery-related exploitation across the humanitarian architecture.
2. Provide needs-based, protection-specific assistance in areas of high displacement to reduce risk factors and vulnerability to slavery-related exploitation.
3. Activate specific and safe referral and incident reporting mechanisms.
4. Provide foundational capacity-building to front-line humanitarian actors on concepts of slavery-related abuse.
5. Undertake strategic communications and awareness-raising with populations at high risk of displacement, through a whole of community approach.
6. Strengthen the evidence base on forced labour, human trafficking and other protection issues in humanitarian settings.
7. Activate accountability and justice mechanisms for victims and survivors.
8. Implement the *Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children's* recommendation of early warning and early screening frameworks for potential or imminent risk of trafficking, especially in managed camps.

## Conclusion

The number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence around the world is the highest it has ever been.<sup>8</sup> This study is the first of its kind to provide estimates of the prevalence of certain forms of slavery-related abuse among displaced populations in Nigeria and South Sudan. The findings also contributed to the evidence base on the nature of slavery-related abuse in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, internally displaced persons remained vulnerable to certain forms of slavery-related abuse despite some protection offered by PoC sites and displacement camps, pointing to the need for security in displacement sites to be improved. In all three countries, most perpetrators of the abuses were armed groups and armed forces. These perpetrators often used violence and threats of violence to coerce IDPs into situations of slavery-related abuse and to keep them from leaving. IDPs who experienced forced labour and forced recruitment often performed activities that facilitated the conflict.

There is an urgent need to improve funding and capacity-building for early detection of at-risk individuals and victims, to improve access to reporting mechanisms and referral pathways, to continue and enhance data collection on slavery-related abuse in these contexts, and to ensure victims have access to justice through strengthened accountability and justice mechanisms.

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# Introduction

Despite data challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, there were 40.5 million people who became internally displaced in 2020. By the end of the year, the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had reached a record 55 million, including 23 million children.<sup>9</sup>

Drivers of displacement are manifold, complex, and, in many cases, escalating. Violence and conflict have led to the displacement of 87 per cent (48 million) of the total number of IDPs.<sup>10</sup> In locations affected by both conflict and disasters, many faced multiple causes of displacement. COVID-19 and pandemic-related restrictions have exacerbated the vulnerabilities experienced by IDPs and disrupted the humanitarian response. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that the economic cost of displacement to individuals, communities, and economies in 2020 totalled almost USD 20.5 billion, accounting for disruptions in income as well as the cost of providing accommodation, education, health, and security to IDPs.<sup>11</sup>

There is a growing understanding that conflict and displacement increases vulnerability to forms of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and armed forces, forced marriage, human trafficking, and related abuses.<sup>12</sup> Over recent years this issue has received increased attention by the international community.<sup>13</sup> The international legal framework pertaining to forced labour, human trafficking and child labour – including in humanitarian settings – are among the most ratified pieces of international law,<sup>14</sup> illustrating that these issues are a high priority for the international community. Nonetheless, few have sought to understand how displacement affects risk of slavery-related abuse faced by IDPs and there is a lack of data on the scale of the problem. To reconcile this, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Walk Free set out to add to the evidence base on the scale and nature of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and armed forces, abductions, human trafficking, and forced marriage among displaced populations.

The research covers three countries, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria. These countries each face protracted conflict that continues to drive significant internal displacement. There are approximately 1 million IDPs in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2.2 million IDPs in North-east Nigeria, and 2 million IDPs across South Sudan.<sup>15</sup> By improving the understanding of the scale of slavery-related abuse experienced by IDPs in displacement sites in these countries, the study aimed to improve understanding of the nature of slavery-related abuse in order to enable better resource allocation, provide a baseline for assessing change over time, and inform interventions that aim to prevent, identify, and rehabilitate victims among IDPs displaced by conflict. While the three survey countries share similarities, there are notable differences in the nature and duration of the conflicts, the number of persons displaced, and the actors involved. The intention of this study was not to compare the countries of interest in terms of rates of slavery-related abuse, but to identify what makes IDPs vulnerable to slavery-related abuse, as well as points of intervention, so as to inform policy that will improve the situations of IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan, and elsewhere.

# Background

This section provides an overview of the conflict and displacement dynamics in South Sudan, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and North-east Nigeria. Recognizing the long-standing and complex nature of these crises, this section does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the respective conflicts, but sets out to provide an overview of the context of displacement as it relates to slavery-related abuse.

## South Sudan

On 9 July 2011, following two destructive civil wars, The Republic of South Sudan seceded from Sudan to become an independent state.<sup>16</sup> Less than three years later on 15 December 2013, a seven-year civil war was triggered by divisions within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),<sup>17</sup> which resulted in South Sudan's president Salva Kiir accusing the former vice-president, Riek Machar, of planning a coup. Rival factions of the armed forces clashed in the capital, Juba, and fighting quickly spread to other parts of the country.<sup>18</sup> Machar formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) to fight against Kiir's government forces.<sup>19</sup> As political leaders from the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan feuded, members of the military from the Dinka ethnic group largely moved to support Kiir while those from the Nuer ethnic group aligned with Machar.<sup>20</sup> After a 2015 peace agreement failed to end the conflict, which only intensified the following year, the warring parties again signed a peace deal on 12 September 2018.<sup>21</sup> A fragile ceasefire continues to be tenuously held between signatories to the agreement, however, conflict persists in various pockets of the country.<sup>22</sup>

Sexual and sex-based violence remained pervasive, with numerous documented incidents of rape and gang rape, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage. Men have been targeted and killed during attacks while women and children have been abducted, with children often being recruited and used by armed forces and armed groups.<sup>23</sup> Civilians have also been targeted and killed along ethnic divisions, forcing significant displacement across South Sudan.<sup>24</sup> By December 2017, one in every three people in the country had been displaced from their homes since the outbreak of conflict four years prior.<sup>25</sup>

As of September 2021, the IOM reported that there were 2 million IDPs across South Sudan.<sup>26</sup> The spread of conflict into the Equatoria region in 2016 led hundreds of thousands of people to flee South Sudan into Uganda, resulting in the largest exodus of refugees in the region since the Rwandan genocide in 1994.<sup>27</sup> Violence persisted in the Equatoria region beyond the 2018 peace deal, leaving the state of Central Equatoria as the last major hot spot of the civil war.<sup>28</sup>

The conflict of December 2013 led tens of thousands of civilians to flee in search of protection at United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) bases.<sup>29</sup> The term "Protection of Civilian" (PoC) sites came to describe situations where IDPs would seek protection at established UNMISS bases amid conflict. Though the bases had provided temporary protection to civilians prior to the outbreak of conflict, December 2013 was the first time PoC sites were formally established.<sup>30</sup> The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between a UN peacekeeping mission and the host government establishes that the UN will be allocated land that will remain under its exclusive control and will be granted "inviolable" status, similar to the status granted to diplomatic missions.<sup>31</sup> The SOFA and the protection of civilians mandate enables IDPs to receive physical protection at UNMISS bases and prevents civilians from being removed by the government or other parties without UN permission. This status provides additional protections for IDPs in PoC sites as opposed to IDP camps, which are located on government or privately owned land and do not grant peacekeepers the same ability to prevent authorities or other parties from entering the settlements.<sup>32</sup>

However, in September 2020, UNMISS announced the withdrawal of troops from PoC sites in South Sudan. Currently, all PoC sites apart from the one in Malakal have been redesignated as formal IDP settlements under the control of the government, with responsibility for law and order at the sites transferred from the UN to the South Sudan National Police Service.<sup>33</sup> In some former-POC sites, reduced services<sup>34</sup> have led humanitarian workers to express concern about a reduction in safety for IDPs.<sup>35</sup> Though PoC sites were not previously immune from attacks,<sup>36</sup> the sites protected hundreds of thousands of IDPs from violence,<sup>37</sup> and were often chosen by IDPs because they perceived PoC sites to be the only safe location.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, most IDPs in the country resided in spontaneous or informal sites or lived with host communities.<sup>39</sup>

## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo entered a civil war following the political instability of the early 1990s and the Rwandan genocide. In 1994, an extremist Hutu regime took power in Rwanda and murdered 800,000 Tutsis. When a Tutsi armed group drove out the Hutu regime, more than a million Hutu fled Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as Zaire), some forming armed groups. The Rwandan armed forces and rebel groups pursued Hutu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and drove out the country's President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, replacing him with rebel leader Laurent Kabila in the First Congo War. In August 1998, after Kabila demanded the Rwandan army exit the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwandan armed forces invaded, drawing other countries in the region into the conflict referred to as "Africa's World War".<sup>40</sup>

North Kivu has long been the epicentre of the conflict. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2002 was unable to end the conflict in the Kivus long term. In 2003, three senior military officers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo defected, including the General Laurent Nkunda, a Tutsi from North Kivu. In 2004, Nkunda's troops launched an attack on the capital of South Kivu, ostensibly to protect the Tutsi population living there. The attack led to massive human rights violations, the displacement of thousands of Tutsis into Rwanda,<sup>41</sup> and started a cycle of violence that is still ongoing, although the actors and shape of the conflict have evolved over time. There has been little in the way of effective peacebuilding or reconciliation, with efforts stymied by the exploitation of local ethnic divisions by both armed groups and the military.

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is fought along economic, political, social, and ethnic lines,<sup>42</sup> and is characterized by a high number of armed groups. It is estimated that there are some 120 armed groups in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu alone.<sup>43</sup> Human rights abuses at the hands of armed groups and armed forces are widespread, with hundreds of cases of murder, torture, and sexual violence against civilians documented over 2017 and 2018 in North Kivu.<sup>44</sup> In 2020, the majority of children recruited and used by armed groups and armed forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were based in North Kivu.<sup>45</sup>

Widespread and ongoing conflict and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has driven mass displacement. The Democratic Republic of the Congo had the second highest number of new displacements due to conflict of any country for 2017, 2018 and 2019, and the highest number in 2020 with 2.2 million new conflict related displacements, bringing the total number of IDPs displaced due to conflict and violence to 5.3 million.<sup>46</sup> In April 2021, the IOM reported more than 1 million IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's North Kivu province alone, the majority (88%) of whom were living in host communities.<sup>47</sup> IDPs, particularly women and children, are exposed to sexual and sex-based violence and forced to engage in survival sex, while displaced children are at risk of being recruited into armed groups.<sup>48</sup>

Humanitarian access can be challenging due to the volatile security situation. Many IDPs in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo are in close proximity to ongoing conflict, most often residing with host communities by seeking refuge with relatives, members of the same ethnic group, or church communities and they try to stay nearby their areas of origin and their livelihoods.<sup>49</sup>

Armed conflict in territories in North Kivu resulted in the gradual withdrawal of humanitarian actors throughout 2017, which further increased the vulnerability of IDPs.<sup>50</sup> Even as emergency needs grew substantially over 2017, global humanitarian funding dynamics led to a decrease in funding for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>51</sup>

In North-Kivu, displacement site coordination and management is shared between by IOM and UNHCR, in collaboration with the governmental counterpart, the National Commission for Refugees (CNR). As of December 2017, when surveys implemented as part of this study commenced, IOM and UNHCR coordinated and managed 28 displacement sites. At that time, IOM had 13 displacement sites under its responsibility, hosting approximately 43,000 IDPs.<sup>52</sup> In general, provincial governments have sought to close camps, allegedly due to the stabilization of some parts of North Kivu, or concern about the potential for harbouring of rebels and violence at the camps, and to undermine NGOs.<sup>53</sup>

The North Kivu camps managed by the two agencies are referred to as “IDP sites,” though the terminology has evolved over time. Previously, older camps were termed “official camps” and coordinated by UNHCR, where IDPs received regular assistance. Newer camps were referred to as “spontaneous sites,” which were perceived as less permanent and received little support from the international community. This changed when IOM took over management of the newer camps in 2012 and the differential terminology referring to these sites was dropped.<sup>54</sup> Displaced people residing at IDP sites can freely leave the camps to access their livelihoods, return home, or visit friends and family in other camps.<sup>55</sup> In 2019, UNHCR reported that one of the most pressing protection needs at its sites in North Kivu was the physical security of IDPs living in and around the sites,<sup>56</sup> while attacks on IDP camps continue in 2021.<sup>57</sup>

## North-east Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency and military response of the Nigerian government have led to widespread displacement and the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians since the conflict began in 2009, spilling across the Lake Chad region to impact not only Nigeria, but also Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger. In 2009, Boko Haram and police forces clashed in Maiduguri, Borno state, which escalated into an armed uprising, the deaths of hundreds of the group’s followers, and the execution of its then leader Mohammed Yusuf. Boko Haram then moved underground until it re-emerged in 2010 with Abubakar Shekau as its leader, launching attacks across the north-east.<sup>58</sup> For the next several years, Boko Haram used guerrilla warfare tactics, bombing major targets including Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, and carried out assassinations and raids across the north-east. From approximately 2013 to 2015, the group’s focus turned to controlling territory,<sup>59</sup> recruiting children to assist with this effort in North-east Nigeria.<sup>60</sup> When the Nigerian armed forces drove Boko Haram from its territory in 2015, the group reverted again to an underground existence and guerrilla tactics.<sup>61</sup>

In 2016, Boko Haram divided into two main factions. The larger faction, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, refers to itself as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Abubakar Shekau, the former leader of Boko Haram, moved to lead militants under the group’s previous name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS),<sup>62</sup> until his death in 2021.<sup>63</sup> Though both factions are associated with high rates of violence, some report that ISWAP directly targeted armed forces, while JAS conducted largely indiscriminate attacks.<sup>64</sup>

The UN estimates that between 2009 and 2017, Boko Haram subjected at least 7,000 women and girls to sexual violence, including through forced marriage.<sup>65</sup> Further, the UN verified 1,650 children were recruited and used by Boko Haram in just three states between July 2015 and December 2016.<sup>66</sup> Boko Haram’s tactics have included abducting civilians during raids on villages or towns to coerce them into fighting or providing support,<sup>67</sup> attacking schools and kidnapping schoolchildren,<sup>68</sup> and using suicide bombers, including women and children, to conduct attacks.<sup>69</sup>



In 2013, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was created to assist the Nigerian security forces and provide security for local populations and displacement sites from Boko Haram attacks.<sup>70</sup> The CJTF was initially formed by local vigilantes to combat Boko Haram's violence, though some reportedly felt they had to fight Boko Haram to avoid suspicion by the security forces that they were members themselves.<sup>71</sup> In 2016, President Buhari commended the CJTF for its role in combating Boko Haram, and particularly for local intelligence its members provided.<sup>72</sup> However, CJTF has also been accused of serious human rights abuses, including violence, killings, bribery, detention of suspects, recruitment of children, and food deprivation.<sup>73</sup>

Since 2014, the ongoing conflict in North-east Nigeria has caused widespread displacement.<sup>74</sup> Indiscriminate attacks against civilians have led millions to flee, both within Nigeria and across its borders.<sup>75</sup> As of December 2021, there were 2.2 million IDPs in North-east Nigeria, mostly hosted in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. Borno alone hosts 74 per cent of the country's IDPs, with just over half of them located in IDP camps.<sup>76</sup>

IOM's DTM reporting assessments were conducted between 30 August and 15 October 2021 across 309 camp and camp-like setting sites and 2,072 host community sites in the six states most affected by the conflict.<sup>77</sup> In almost all states assessed, people living with host communities far outnumbered those in camps and camp-like settings, except in Borno where more than half of IDPs resided in camp and camp-like settings.<sup>78</sup> The majority (72%) of camp and camp-like settings were classified as spontaneous, and 84 per cent of camp and camp-like settings were regarded as informal sites. Types of camp and camp-like setting include collective settlements (58%), camps (41%), and transitional centres (1%). Both camps and camp-like settings and IDPs residing with host communities were most likely to be located on private property, followed by publicly owned land, and ancestral ground.<sup>79</sup>

Boko Haram has actively targeted IDPs and refugees. According to the Institute for Security Studies, there were 32 attacks on displaced people between 2015 and 2017, more than half of which occurred in 2017.<sup>80</sup> It is believed that the JAS faction, which tended to conduct indiscriminate attacks, was behind most of these.<sup>81</sup> The threat of attacks from non-state armed groups prompted calls for increased security in and around displacement camps.<sup>82</sup> Those residing in IDP camps in North-east Nigeria also face risks of experiencing sexual exploitation, labour exploitation, and trafficking.<sup>83</sup>



A man points at bullet holes in a school in North-west Nigeria that was attacked by Boko Haram, December 2020. Boko Haram's tactics have included abducting civilians, targeting schools and kidnapping children, and using suicide bombers to conduct attacks. Photo credit: Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images.

## Objectives of the study

This study was designed to achieve the following objectives:

1. Estimate the prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or armed forces, forced marriage, and abductions among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in three conflict-affected contexts: North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and North-east Nigeria.
2. Improve the understanding about the characteristics of populations affected by forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and armed forces, forced marriage, and abductions in a conflict context as well as associated risk and protective factors.
3. Provide practical, evidence-based recommendations to inform the humanitarian-peace-development responses in conflict-affected settings. This includes recommendations related to the protection needs and risks facing IDPs in conflict-affected locations.
4. Make a methodological contribution to social science research by drawing on recent measurements of forced labour, testing the feasibility of a probabilistic survey in a crisis context.



Civilians sit on a hill facing a displacement camp in North-east Nigeria, August 2018. Non-state armed groups have actively targeted IDPs and refugees in attacks. The threat of attacks from non-state armed groups prompted calls for increased security and around displacement camps. Photo credit: Stefan Heunis/AFP via Getty Images.

# Terminology

## Slavery-Related Abuse

Slavery-related abuse is an umbrella term used to collectively refer to situations of exploitation including forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, abduction, forced marriage, human trafficking, and recruitment of child soldiers. In other contexts, slavery-related abuse is referred to as modern slavery.

## Forced Labour

Forced labour is defined by the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) as “all work or service that is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” A forced labour situation is determined by the nature of the relationship between a person and an “employer” and not by the type of activity performed, however arduous or hazardous the conditions of work may be, nor by its legality or illegality under national law. Forced labour includes forced labour exploitation, forced sexual exploitation, and state-imposed forced labour.

Forced labour of adults is defined as work for which a person has not offered him or herself voluntarily (criterion of “involuntariness”) and which is performed under coercion (criterion of “menace of penalty”) applied by an employer or a third party. The coercion may take place during the worker’s recruitment process to force him or her to accept the job or, once the person is working, to force him or her to do tasks that were not part of what was agreed to at the time of recruitment or to prevent him or her from leaving the job.

Forced labour of children is defined as work performed by a child under coercion applied by a third party (other than his or her parents) either to the child or to the child’s parents, or work performed by a child as a direct consequence of his or her parent or parents being engaged in forced labour. The coercion may take place during the child’s recruitment to force the child and his or her parents to accept the job or, once the child is working, to force him or her to do tasks that were not part of what was agreed to at the time of recruitment or to prevent the child from leaving the work.

## Forced Recruitment into Armed Groups/Armed Forces

An armed group refers to an armed wing of a non-state party to an armed conflict and may involve “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups,” as written in the Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.<sup>84</sup> Under humanitarian law, the term “armed forces” refers to members of a state party to a conflict.<sup>85</sup>

The forcible recruitment of adults into armed groups or armed forces may be classified as forced labour and/or human trafficking. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) defines forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict as a worst form of child labour.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict prohibits all recruitment – voluntary or compulsory – of children under 18 years by armed forces and groups. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes it a war crime to conscript or enlist children under the age of 15 years or use them to participate actively in hostilities.

## Abduction

According to UNICEF, abduction refers to the unlawful removal, seizure, capture, apprehension, or enforced disappearance of a person either temporarily or permanently. The abduction of children is one of the six grave violations against children in armed conflict identified and condemned by the United Nations Security Council.<sup>86</sup> Abduction can be a means of recruitment for human trafficking, though not all cases of abduction are human trafficking cases.

## Forced Marriage

Forced marriage is a marriage in which one and/or both parties, regardless of age, have not personally given their full and free consent to the union.<sup>87</sup> A person may be forced to marry through physical, emotional, or financial duress, or by deception, and this may be by family members, the spouse, or others. Forced marriage is included with prohibitions on slavery and slavery-like practices, including servile marriage.<sup>88</sup> Child marriage is generally considered to be forced marriage, given that, one and/or both parties are incapable of providing full, free, and informed consent. However, in many countries this is subject to limited exceptions where 16 and 17-year-olds who wish to marry are legally able to do so following a judicial ruling or parental consent.<sup>89</sup>

## Trafficking in Persons

Trafficking in persons, or human trafficking as it is also known, is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.<sup>90</sup> Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol defines trafficking as a process with three key elements:

1. **An act** involving recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons;
2. **By means** of threat, deception, force, or other forms of coercion;
3. **For the purpose of exploitation.** Exploitation may take various forms, including sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced begging, organ removal, and slavery and slavery-like practices.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve threat, use of force, or coercion.



A South Sudanese woman folds her hands in her lap. Women and girls in South Sudan are disproportionately vulnerable to certain forms of slavery-related abuses, including forced marriage. The average age that women and girls were forced to marry was 17. Photo credit: Jadwiga Figula via Getty Images.

# Methodology

## Sampling

The study was conducted in three countries: South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria. The target population was internally displaced persons aged 15 and over residing in IDP camps or host communities in North-east Nigeria, in PoC sites in South Sudan, and in displacement sites in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (referred to collectively herein as displacement sites). The survey was designed to produce reliable estimates of prevalence for certain forms of slavery-related abuse at the national level.

### SAMPLE FRAME AND DESIGN

In South Sudan and North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, a stratified two-stage systematic sample was employed and the sample frame was the population of biometrically registered IDPs in each country from the DTM databases maintained and updated by the IOM.

In South Sudan, five of six PoC sites within the country were sampled. As of 24 August 2017, these five PoC sites were home to 99 per cent of individuals living in PoC sites in the country. Within each PoC site, the sample was stratified by blocks, which form the smallest administrative units of the sites. The first stage of selection was the household within PoC site blocks. The target number of households sampled in each PoC site was proportional to the size of the population in the PoC site. For example, if a PoC site contained 40 per cent of the IDP population in the five camps surveyed, 40 per cent of the sample of 2,000 was allocated to that PoC site. Thus, more households were sampled in IDP sites with larger populations and fewer households sampled in IDP sites with smaller populations. The systematic selection of households and the second stage of selection – selection of an individual within the household – are detailed below.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the sample was confined to the province of North Kivu, which was home to about a quarter of those displaced by conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the time the sample was drawn. In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, at the time of data collection, there were 13 populated IOM-coordinated displacement sites and 15 populated UNHCR-coordinated displacement sites. Sites coordinated by IOM and UNHCR were often in close proximity to each other in each subdivision (“territoire”) and there was movement of IDPs between IOM – and UNHCR-coordinated sites. Given that the system of IDP registration in the sites coordinated by IOM and UNHCR were not integrated, the sampling frame could not be accurately defined. For this reason, the decision was made to sample all 13 IOM-coordinated IDP sites. Surveys were also implemented in two UNHCR-coordinated PoC sites for comparison purposes. The sample was stratified by IDP site, with the sample allocation per IDP site proportionate to the population of the IDP site as a proportion of the registered IDP population in IOM-coordinated sites.

The first stage of selection was the household within the IDP site and the second stage of selection was the respondent within the household. Population counts as of 25 September 2017 were used to calculate the relative weight of each IDP site in the overall population of interest and the sample size required for each IDP site. The systematic selection of households and the second stage of selection, selection of an individual within the household, is detailed below.

In Nigeria, the sample was drawn from three states in the North-east region, where around 93 per cent of IDPs in Nigeria were hosted.<sup>91</sup> A stratified cluster sampling approach was used to sample IDPs in three states (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe) in the north-east of the country (herein referred to as North-east Nigeria).

This was based on a wider cluster sample of IDPs developed by the World Bank and IOM in the region, based on the DTM biometric IDP registration database.<sup>92</sup>

The challenge in building a representative sample of IDPs in Nigeria is that many people reside in host communities for which spatial sampling techniques could not be used without bias. Faced with the same difficulty, IOM and the World Bank had precisely mapped each host community for the purpose of household selection within each site. Samples were drawn from within IOM and World Bank survey sites as these maps had been drawn shortly before the current study. In North-east Nigeria, the sample was stratified by state and type of IDP site (camp or host communities). The

systematic selection of households and the second stage of selection – selection of an individual within the household – are detailed below.

In all three survey countries, the systematic selection of households commenced once the field team reached the sampling unit (block, sector, or camp in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or North-east Nigeria respectively). The team divided themselves to occupy all the access points (roads, lanes) in the sampling unit and counted the number of dwelling units that were eligible on each of these access points. They then calculated the sampling interval by dividing the number of dwelling units by the target number of households to be sampled in the sampling unit. The team then randomly selected a starting number that referred to the dwelling with which to begin the survey (e.g. the second dwelling in the lane) and the sampling interval informing the number of houses skipped before the next house is selected. For example, a sampling interval of four indicates four houses are to be skipped and the fifth house is to be selected into the sample. Where nobody was home or available for an interview, the survey team replaced the household with the household from the neighbouring dwelling.

Once households were selected, the study employed a multiplicity or network sample design whereby a selected household member and all his or her immediate family form the ultimate sampling units of the survey, irrespective of where the family member resides and whether they are living or deceased. The inclusion of deceased family members was to allow for analysis of survival bias. An explicit definition of “family” was used and included parents, spouse/partner, siblings, and children, including half siblings but not stepparents or stepsiblings. This type of design increases sampling efficiency, especially for the measure of rare and/or clustered population characteristics.<sup>93</sup> This has implications for the probability of selection since the larger the family unit, the more chances a family member has of selection. For network sampling to provide an unbiased estimate, the size of the network therefore needs to be taken to consideration via weighting. The calculation of weights is explained further in the section below. The use of network sampling can introduce bias due to memory failures. This often results in more reliable answers given by respondents about their own experiences (self-responses) and less reliable answers given by respondents reporting on experiences of family members (proxy-responses) and can bias prevalence estimates. Weight adjustments have been made to correct for these memory failures and are explained in greater detail in the subsection on weighting below.

## SAMPLE SIZE

The statistical power associated with a sample size depends on the sampling design, on the prevalence rate and the variance of the phenomenon being studied, and on the level of statistical precision one wishes to achieve. Precision can be defined in absolute terms (when one wishes to bracket the estimated prevalence rate within a certain absolute distance to the true rate) or in relative terms (when one wishes to bracket the estimated prevalence within a certain proportion of the true rate). As the three surveyed forms of exploitation are expected to be relatively rare events, we opted for a relative precision target of 20 per cent ( $d=0.2$ ).

In the case of a simple random sample (as in South Sudan and North Kivu), the equation relating the sample size ( $N$ ), the prevalence rate of slavery-related abuses ( $p$ ) and the relative precision target ( $d$ ) is given by:

$$N = 1.96^2(1 - p)d^2p$$

With  $N=2,000$  and  $d=0.2$ , the survey of primary respondents was designed to allow us to measure a prevalence rate of slavery-related abuse of 4.5 per cent with a relative precision of 20 per cent. Based on the conservative estimate of a family network of five individuals, the whole network sample was estimated to be at least 10,000 individuals. With such a network sample, we can measure a prevalence rate of less than 1 per cent with a relative precision of 20 per cent.

In the case of a cluster sample (as in North-east Nigeria), the statistical power associated with a sample size of 2,000 primary respondents is lower than for a simple random sample. As individuals tend to be more similar within clusters than across clusters, a cluster sample results in a loss of statistical power. The higher the similarity of individuals within clusters, and the fewer the number of clusters, the greater the sample size needs to be. The design effect (Deff) is the ratio of the variance expected from the intended sampling method to the variance expected with a simple random sample or, in other words, the actual sample size divided by the sample size you would expect if you were using simple random sampling.

$$Deff = [1 + (m - 1).ICC]$$

Where  $m$  is the cluster size and  $ICC$  is the intracluster correlation coefficient.

The  $ICC$  is the proportion of outcome variance that is between clusters rather than between individuals within clusters.<sup>94</sup>

The equation to compute the sample size needed for a cluster sampling design is thus:

$$N^* = N * Deff = 1.96^2 \frac{(1 - p)}{d^2 p} [1 + (m - 1).ICC]$$

It was assumed that the design effect could plausibly be between 1.5 and 3. This means the variance is between one and a half and three times as large as you would expect with simple random sampling. Given this, the sample size for a cluster sample should be one and a half to three times the size of a sample drawn with simple random sampling to achieve the same statistical power. It turned out that the  $ICC$  for slavery-related abuse in Nigeria was very low (0.7%). Given that the average cluster size was 26 households, the design effect associated with the survey was 2.75. This meant that based on the sample of 2,000 primary respondents, we would be able to measure a prevalence rate of 11 per cent with a relative precision of 20 per cent. Based on the network sample of 10,000 individuals, we would be able to measure a prevalence rate of 2.5 per cent with a relative precision of 20 per cent.

## Data collection

### SURVEY TOOL

The survey tool was designed to collect information on specific forms of slavery-related abuse known to occur among the target population, and on the context of these experiences. These included forced labour, forced recruitment, and forced marriage. Questions were also included to gather information on abduction based on advice from front-line humanitarian personnel. The survey did not collect information that links the act of abduction to the criminal intent to exploit, which is one of three elements required to meet the definition of human trafficking. However, the survey did capture whether individuals were both abducted and experienced forced labour or forced recruitment.

The questionnaire was composed of three parts:

1. A set of questions to define the network of immediate family members, both living and deceased.
2. A set of questions on the displacement experiences of the household, including displacement history of the household, pre – and post-displacement socioeconomic status, and exposure to armed conflict and aid.
3. A set of questions on experiences of forced labour, forced recruitment, forced marriage and abductions/ disappearances.



Each set of questions on forced labour, forced recruitment, abductions, and forced marriage started with a direct filter question asking the respondent whether they and each member of their immediate family had ever experienced that particular form of slavery-related abuse. For example, “Has [name of family member] ever been forced to work or to accept a job?” If, in response to the filter question, the respondent answers yes, a range of follow-up questions were asked.

Follow-up questions on forced labour and forced recruitment gathered information on the type of work/activity undertaken, the type of coercion, the person responsible for the force/coercion, the consequences if the respondent or family member were to have refused or left the situation, and the timing and duration of the experience. Among those who indicated they or their family experienced forced labour, additional questions on the location of the work were asked.

Follow-up questions on forced marriage gathered information on how they or a family were forced into the marriage, the person/people responsible for the marriage, and when the marriage took place.

Follow-up questions on abductions/disappearances gathered information on the location and timing of the disappearance, the person(s) responsible, and whether and to what degree contact was maintained with an abducted family member.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria questionnaire, an additional follow-up question to the forced labour, forced recruitment, and forced marriage screening question asked the respondent to explain in their own words what happened. These were recorded verbatim by the interviewer to aid validation of a case of forced labour, forced recruitment, or forced marriage during the analysis. See the section *counting rules* for more detail.

The types of work/activity were grouped into 12 sectors primarily based on the classification of industries from ISIC Rev.4.<sup>95</sup> Categories for begging and illicit activities were added to capture two commonly reported activities that people are forced to undertake.\*

The answers on the penalty or menace of penalty were coded into the following categories:

- Physical violence
  - Sexual violence
  - Threats of physical violence
  - Threats of sexual violence
  - Threats against family
  - Locked in work or living quarters
  - Kept drugged/drunken
  - Punished through deprivation of food, sleep, or other benefits
  - Punished through fine/financial penalty
  - Threats of legal action
  - Withheld passport or other documents
  - Had to repay debt
  - Withheld wages
  - Threat of being kept drugged/drunken
  - Threat of being punished through deprivation of food, sleep, or other benefits
  - Threat of fine/financial penalty
  - Threat of withholding passport or other documents
  - Threat of withheld wages
  - Pressured/organized by family or relatives
- 
- Accommodation and food services, agriculture, forestry, and fishing, arts, entertainment, and recreation, begging, construction, domestic labour, fighting (including fighting, military actions, other military actions), mining and quarrying, personal services, prostitution/sexual exploitation, support service to armed forces/armed groups (such as portering, spying), and wholesale and retail trade.

## DATA COLLECTION IN SOUTH SUDAN

The survey was administered in English during September 2017. While field teams fell just short of reaching the target sample, larger deviations between the target sample and the achieved sample by PoC site can be observed in Table 1. Weighting was used to correct for deviations from the sampling plan. See section on *weighting* for further detail. Sample allocation of selected households and individuals by PoC site are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.

Table 1. Sample allocation of selected households by Protection of Civilian Site in South Sudan

PoC Site Name	Total households (N)	Target sample size (n households)	Achieved sample size (n households)	Difference between target and sample (%)
Bentiu	20,821	801	736	-8
Malakal	9,184	354	365	+3.1
UN House Juba 1	3,211	124	262	+112
UN House Juba 3	11,612	447	268	-40
Wau	7,199	277	304	+9.7
Total	52,027	2,003	1,935	-3.4

Table 2. Sampled individuals by Protection of Civilian Site in South Sudan

PoC Site Name	Total population aged 5+ (N)	Achieved sample size (n individuals)
Bentiu	72,922	4,817
Malakal	20,457	2,107
UN House Juba 1	6,688	1,996
UN House Juba 3	24,762	2,005
Wau	24,529	2,381
Total	149,358	13,306

The selection of primary respondents within the household was non-random. While every individual aged 15 and over was eligible to be interviewed, the decision was made by field teams to invite the head of household, as nominated by present household members, to act as the primary respondent. This was due to the wider context within displacement sites and the ongoing relationships between humanitarian agencies and displaced communities, which make it challenging to bypass heads of household if they are present. It was also thought that these household members would have the greatest knowledge of the experiences of immediate family members. In most cases, those nominated turned out to be “female heads” (i.e. spouses of the head) so that the primary respondents were seldom male or older household members. As a result, 79 per cent of primary respondents in South Sudan were female.

### Sample profile

The sample includes 1,928 primary respondents who reported on their own experiences and the experiences of their immediate family members who were living or who had died since displacement, bringing the total sample to 13,308 individuals. On average, primary respondents’ immediate family networks are made up of 6.1 members (including the primary respondent). As a result of non-random selection of female household heads for the interview in the data collection phase, 79 per cent of primary respondents were female and 21 per cent were male, with an average age of 35.7 years. Table 3 presents the unweighted sex and age group breakdowns for primary respondents.

Almost all (99%) sampled individuals were displaced and 89 per cent lived in the same household as the primary respondent. Of the total sample, 6 per cent had died since displacement and most of those (82%) were male.

Table 4 presents the unweighted sex and age breakdown of all sampled participants who were displaced and alive at the time of interview. Just over half (51%) of the sample were female and the average age was 21.4 years, with half the sample aged under 18 years.

Table 3. Primary respondents by sex and age group

Age group (years)	Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
15-17	29	1.9	5	1.2	34	1.8
18-34	849	55.9	164	39.7	1,013	52.4
35-49	487	32.1	159	38.5	646	33.4
50 and older	154	10.1	85	20.6	239	12.4
Total	1,519	100	413	100	1,932	100

Table 4. Sampled participants by sex and age groups (displaced and living at the time of interview)

Age group (years)	Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
less than 5	729	11.7	811	13.5	1,540	12.6
5-17	2,257	36.1	2,445	40.8	4,702	38.4
18-34	1,974	31.6	1,401	23.4	3,375	27.6
35-49	850	13.6	849	14.2	1,702	13.9
50 and older	439	7.03	490	8.2	929	7.6
Total	6,252	100	5,996	100	12,248	100

### Displacement experiences among primary respondents

Nearly all primary respondents (98%) were displaced after the outset of the armed conflict in 2012. Most respondents were displaced between 2013 and 2016, with the proportion declining from 2014 onwards. On average, primary respondents had been displaced for 2.8 years at the time of interview.

Most (71%) primary respondents cited safety concerns as the reason for coming to the displacement site. Other reasons included the availability of services in the IDP site (14%), the closeness of the IDP site from home (5%), and the presence of friends and family in the IDP site (4%). Five per cent of respondents reported they did not have a choice. Almost half (49.7%) of primary respondents did not receive any aid prior to displacement, while 41 per cent had access to aid in the form of food and non-food items, 22 per cent were provided shelter, and 19 per cent were provided with water or sanitation assistance.

Forty-six per cent of primary respondents reported the presence of attacks from armed groups or armed forces in their village prior to displacement. Of those who did report attacks in their village prior to displacement, just over a quarter (27%) reported that attacks occurred more than once a month and another 24 per cent reported almost monthly attacks. Most primary respondents (83%) considered that their household had been directly affected by the attacks. The most common consequences of the attacks were damage or destruction of assets (73%), damage or destruction of the house (64%), distress, anxiety or fear (53%), physical injuries (51%), and loss of income (46%).

### DATA COLLECTION IN NORTH KIVU, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The survey was administered in French between November 2017 and February 2018. Safety issues also impacted sampling within IDP sites, for example, in the JTN site, the team was able to achieve only 45 per cent of the target sample. Safety issues meant that no surveys could be conducted in four of the IDP sites selected into the sample – Katoyi, Kasenyi, Malemo, and Rushashi. Table 5 presents differences between target and achieved samples by IDP site for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Table 6 presents the division of all sampled individuals (primary respondents and their immediate family network) among IDP sites.

To reach the target sample size of 2,000 per country, data from UNHCR-managed IDP sites, initially collected for comparison purposes only, were added to the sample. Since there is a considerable amount of movement between IOM and UNHCR controlled sites, a clear sampling frame could not be defined. A reliable sampling frame is needed to ensure representativeness and thus the results presented for North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, are unweighted and cannot be generalized to the national population of IDPs in displacement sites.

Table 5. Sample allocation of selected households by IDP camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

IDP Camp Name	Coordinating organization	Total households (N)	Target sample size (n households)	Achieved sample size (n households)	Achieved sample (% of the target sample)
Bushani	IOM	427	68	61	90
Katale	IOM	1,710	273	264	97
Kibabi/Buporo	IOM	541	87	86	99
Kibabi/Police	IOM	313	50	45	90
Katoyi	IOM	600	96	0	0
Kasenyi	IOM	779	124	0	0
Muheto	IOM	934	149	114	77
Mungote	UNHCR	3,358	0	387	
Malemo	IOM	469	75	0	0
Kizimba	IOM	1,138	182	134	74
Rushashi	IOM	582	93	0	0
JTN	IOM	755	121	55	45
Kabizo	IOM	2426	386	382	99
Kanaba	IOM	1,896	302	319	106
Kahe	UNHCR	1,668	0	196	
Total		17,596	2,006	2,043	102

Table 6. Sampled individuals by IDP camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

IDP Camp Name	Coordinating organization	Total individual	Achieved sample size
Bushani	UNHCR	2,508	366
Bambu	UNHCR	1,700	1
Bukombo	IOM	1,232	1
Ibuga	UNHCR	11,493	1
JTN	IOM	2,289	340
Kabizo	IOM	10,336	2,992
Kahe	UNHCR	6,940	1,496
Kanaba	UNHCR	2,847	2,448
Katale	UNHCR	6,195	1,904
Kibabi/Buporo	IOM	6,943	669
Kibabi/Police	IOM	1,971	313
Kizimba	UNHCR	12,494	874
Kalembe-Kalonge	UNHCR	5,891	1
Kalinga	IOM	5,671	1
Kasenyi	IOM	1,266	1
Kashuga	UNHCR	1,404	1
Kasoko	IOM	2,196	1
Katoyi	IOM	1,268	1
Kelengera	UNHCR	7,016	1
Kihondo	UNHCR	6,695	1
Kikuku	IOM	3,137	1
Kyahala	UNHCR	2,256	1
Muheto	IOM	1,572	745
Mungote	IOM	2,549	3,071
Malemo	UNHCR	15,882	1
Mweso	UNHCR	5,153	1
Nyanzale-Marche	UNHCR	3,943	1
Rushashi	IOM	2,327	1
Total		135,174	15,235

The selection of primary respondents within the household was non-random for similar reasons as explained above in relation to respondent selection within the household in South Sudan. In most cases, those nominated turned out to be “female heads” so that the primary respondents were seldom male household members. As a result, 76 per cent of primary respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo sample were female.

## Sample profile

The sample includes 2,043 primary respondents who reported on their own experiences and the experiences of their immediate family members who were living or who had died since displacement, bringing the total sample to 15,235 individuals. On average, primary respondents' immediate family networks are made up of 8.4 members (including the primary respondent). Over three quarters (76%) of primary respondents were female. The mean age of primary respondents was 39 years. Table 7 presents the unweighted sex and age group breakdowns for primary respondents. Almost three quarters were aged between 18 and 49 years, a quarter were aged over 50, and 2 per cent of primary respondents were aged under 18.

Table 7. Sex and age of primary respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Age group (years)	Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
5-17	28	1.8	9	1.8	37	1.8
18-34	706	45.7	170	34.1	876	42.9
35-49	469	30.4	146	29.3	615	30.1
50 and over	342	22.1	173	34.7	515	25.2
Total	1,545	100.0	498	100.0	2,043	100.0

Looking to the full sample of individuals, just under three quarters (74%) of sampled individuals were displaced and 41 per cent lived with the primary respondent. One in five sampled individuals had died since displacement and of those, 61 per cent were male.

The sex and ages of sampled individuals that were both displaced and living at the time of interview is presented in Table 8. Just over half the sample that was displaced and living at the time of interview (53%) was female. The average age of the sample was 27 years, with a large proportion, 43 per cent of sampled individuals, aged under 18.

Table 8. Sex and age of sampled individuals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who were displaced and alive at the time of interview

Age group (years)	Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Less than 5	428	7.8	468	9.7	896	8.7
5-17	1,770	32.1	1,751	36.4	3,521	34.1
18-34	1,497	27.2	1,067	22.2	2,564	24.9
35-49	865	15.7	707	14.7	1,572	15.2
50 and over	949	17.2	814	16.9	1,763	17.1
Total	5,509	100	4,807	100	10,316	100

## Displacement experiences among primary respondents

Primary respondents reported that they were displaced between 2010 and 2018, with 42 per cent of primary respondents displaced in the years 2015 and 2016, coinciding with escalating ethnic tensions<sup>96</sup> and increasing violence by rebel groups, particularly in North Kivu.<sup>97</sup> On average, primary respondents had been displaced for 3.1 years at the time of interview.

An overwhelming number of primary respondents (87%) reported that there had been attacks from armed groups or armed forces in their village prior to displacement. In 44 per cent of cases, attacks occurred monthly or more frequently and an additional 39 per cent reported attacks occurred almost monthly. Almost all (98%) primary respondents consider that their household had been directly affected by the attacks, with damage or destruction of assets (73%) and damage to the house (30%) the most common ways respondents were affected, followed by physical injuries (25%). This explains a high level of safety and security concerns at the time of displacement, with conflict or fear of conflict cited by 93 per cent of primary respondents as the reason for displacement. Of primary respondents, 1 per cent reported that forced labour was a reason for displacement and 1 per cent reported forced recruitment as a reason.

## DATA COLLECTION IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

The data collection took place between 27 July and 3 October 2018 and was administered in 77 IDP sites in three states in North-east Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Overall, the sample contains one camp and eight host communities in Adamawa, one camp and two host communities in Yobe, and 35 camps and 32 host communities in Borno (see Table 9). In Adamawa, 195 households were sampled. In Yobe, 117 households were sampled. In Borno, 1,720 households were sampled. Regarding host communities, 20 households were sampled in each site. The sample is representative of a population of 120,370 households and 628,381 individuals, with 70 per cent of them living in camps (see Table 10).

Table 9. Sample allocation of selected households by state in North-east Nigeria

State	Total sites (camps and host communities)	Total households	Target sample size (households)	Achieved sample size (households)
Adamawa	9	1,903	195	178
Borno	65	11,7079	1,720	1,702
Yobe	3	1,388	117	135
Total	77	120,370	2,032	2,015

Table 10. Sampled individuals by state in North-east Nigeria

State	Total individuals in sampled camps	Sampled individuals in camp/camp-like settings	Sampled individuals in host communities	Achieved sample size (individuals)
Adamawa	8,627	312	1,336	1,648
Borno	611,462	5,654	3,942	9,596
Yobe	8,292	707	471	1,178
Total	628,381	6,673	5,749	12,422

## Sample profile

The sample for North-east Nigeria includes 1,679 primary respondents who reported on their own experiences and the experiences of their immediate family members who were living or who had died since displacement, bringing the total sample to 12,422 individuals. On average, primary respondents' immediate family networks are made of 5.4 members (including the primary respondent). Just over half (54%) of primary respondents are female. The mean age of primary respondents is 41, with a quarter being under 30 years of age. Table 11 presents the age and sex of primary respondents.

Table 11. Primary respondents in North-east Nigeria by sex and age group

Age group (years)	Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
5-17	8	0.9	0	0	8	0.5
18-34	415	46.8	168	21.2	583	34.7
35-49	292	32.9	348	43.9	640	38.1
50 and over	172	19.4	276	34.9	448	26.7
Total	887	100	792	100	1,679	100

Almost everyone in the sample was displaced (99%) and 97 per cent lived in the same house as the self-respondent. Just under 3 per cent of the sampled individuals had died since displacement.

Table 12 presents the unweighted sex and age breakdown of all sampled participants who were displaced and alive at the time of interview. Half of the sample were female, and the average age was 21.2 years, with over half the sample (53.1%) aged under 18 years.

Table 12. Sampled participants in North-east Nigeria by sex and age groups (displaced and living at the time of interview)

Age group (years)	Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Less than 5	851	14.2	914	15.3	1,765	14.7
5-17	2,190	36.5	2,407	40.2	4,597	38.3
18-34	1,737	28.9	1,133	18.9	2,870	23.9
35-49	805	13.4	839	14.0	1,644	13.7
50 and over	420	7.0	698	11.7	1,118	9.3
Total	6,003	100	5,991	100	11,994	100



## Displacement experiences among primary respondents

Almost half of primary respondents were displaced in 2014 and just under 40 per cent were displaced in the three years from the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2016. This follows the declaration of a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May 2013 after violence escalated between Boko Haram and the armed forces,<sup>98</sup> and roughly coincides with a period of increased territorial control by Boko Haram.<sup>99</sup> On average, primary respondents had been displaced for 3.3 years at the time of interview.

Conflict or fear of conflict were cited by virtually all (97%) of the respondents as a reason for displacement, presenting a picture of a highly insecure, volatile, and risky context. Exactly 4 per cent of primary respondents reported that their displacement was due to abduction or to avoid abduction. Just under 2 per cent of primary respondents reported the desire to avoid extortion from armed groups or forces as a reason for displacement and just over 1 per cent reported forced labour or desire to avoid forced labour as a reason.

Among primary respondents, 83 per cent reported attacks from armed groups or armed forces in their village prior to displacement. In 12 per cent of the cases, these attacks occurred more than once a month and in 31 per cent of the cases, these attacks occurred almost once a month. Among primary respondents that reported attacks on their village, 77 per cent reported that their household was directly affected by the attacks.

## Analysis

Analysis of the survey data was completed using statistical software packages Microsoft Excel and Stata.

The analysis included estimating prevalence of each form of slavery-related abuse among the study population in South Sudan and North-east Nigeria, with breakdowns by age and sex, and whether an adult or child. These were based on all sampled individuals aged 5 years and older who were displaced and living at the time of data collection. Prevalence estimates were not calculated for forced marriage or recruitment of child soldiers in any of the surveyed countries due to small numbers and concerns that this was, in part, due to hesitancy to report on these forms of exploitation due to stigma and cultural norms regarding what constitutes a forced marriage. In North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, unweighted proportions of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions are presented.

Descriptive statistics are presented for displacement experiences of primary respondents, demographics of the sample, and characteristics of the experiences of slavery-related abuses, such as forms of coercion, duration of exploitation, and perpetrators of the abuse. All analyses of the characteristics of slavery-related abuse are based on those displaced at the time of interview or who had died since displacement and who experienced one or more forms of slavery-related abuse in the past 5 years. Where numbers are small, unweighted results are presented and noted throughout.

Multivariate logistic regressions were used to assess the relationship between each form of slavery-related abuse and a range of predictor variables including individual characteristics (the sex and age of the person) and pre-displacement household characteristics such as household size, exposure to attacks, access to aid, and ownership of assets (a proxy for socioeconomic status). The relationship to the primary respondent was included as a control variable in all models. In North-east Nigeria, the small case numbers of forced labour and forced recruitment negated the ability to perform the analyses for these forms of slavery-related abuse. Age and sex were the only predictors included in modelling the outcome of being abducted.

## COUNTING RULES

A report of forced labour, forced recruitment, or forced marriage was counted if

1. the response to the screening question was yes, and
2. a form of coercion was reported

Interviewers were trained to probe the respondent to elicit information on the involuntary nature of the work/ recruitment/marriage so that only cases of involuntary episodes were recorded. Where the respondent reported a penalty for refusing or leaving the situation that was not a recognized form or coercion, interviewers reclassified a case as not being forced labour, forced marriage, or forced recruitment. For example, if a respondent reported that “I needed the money and so I agreed to work” the interviewer recorded that the respondent had not experienced forced labour.

In the analysis of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria datasets, the *verbatim* responses to the question “can you tell me what happened?” were used to help to validate a case of forced labour, recruitment, marriage, or abduction where there was ambiguity in the response to the question on form of coercion.

## WEIGHTING

This study used a complex sample design to balance cost with the need for precise and unbiased estimates for IDP populations in the study sites. Because of this, the samples were not completely self-weighting and weights were applied to compensate for various imperfections in the sample that might lead to bias. Only the results from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, are unweighted.

### Base weights

To compensate for unequal probabilities of selection, base were first calculated to account for unequal probabilities of household selection. The base weight of a sampled unit (in this study, a household) is the reciprocal of its probability of selection. For example, in the South Sudan IDP site Bentiu, each of the sampled 736 households represented the 20,821 households in the site. Each household thus had a probability of inclusion of 0.035. It follows that each selected household represents 28.3 households.

The base weights were then adjusted to account for the different probabilities of selection of different family networks, given that persons who are members of large family networks had higher probability of being selected in the sample. This is done by dividing the base weights over the size of the network.

Thus, an individual weight is calculated as follows:

$$w_i = \frac{N}{n} \times \frac{1}{\text{network size}}$$

Where  $w_i$  is the individual weight,  $N$  is the total number of households in the displacement site and  $n$  is the number of households sampled.

### Poststratification

Poststratification adjusts the weighted sample distribution for key variables of interest, such as sex and age, to make it conform to the known population distribution. The intention is to adjust the base weights of the sampled persons in such a way as to make the sum of weights match the population totals within the specified subgroups. Poststratification is most effective when the variables used to define the control distributions are highly correlated with key study variables.

This is particularly important for South Sudan, where selection of the respondent within the household was non-random and tended to be the female head of the household. As a result, females of a certain age are overrepresented in the sample. Poststratification was used to adjust the weights for the South Sudan results only.

Poststratification was used to calibrate weighted sample totals to subpopulation totals in Stata Version 15. Camp population head counts by sex and broad age groups (0–5 years, 5–17 years, 18–59 years, and 60 years and over) are available for IOM-managed IDP camps. These are also drawn from individual and household biometric registration databases. IOM population head count data were used to adjust sample weights for age and sex at camp level. While sex breakdowns by broad age groups were available at sector and block level, block-level analysis yielded small counts, and in some cases, zero-counts, leading to overly inflated weights. As there is no sector-level geographic unit in two of the five camps, the UN House camps, poststratification was performed at camp level.

In one of the camps, Bentiu, population data on age groups were not available. Bentiu is the largest camp and makes up almost half the IDP population situated within IDP sites in South Sudan. Population data on age groups was available for the other four of the five camps in South Sudan, with age groups broadly defined as 0–5 years, 5–17 years, 18–59 years, and 60 years and over. Several cells within the sex-age sample distributions where age was under 18 had zero counts. Given the broad age groups, small cell sizes for those aged under 18 and over 60 when distributed by sex and camp, and given lack of population data on age, poststratification adjusted for sex only. Checks on standard errors using post-stratified weights showed small increases (<0.05%) compared to base weights and was accepted in lieu of reduced bias.

### Adjustment for self and proxy reports

During the analysis, large differences between prevalence rates of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abduction among self-respondents and proxy responses were observed.

Previous studies have acknowledged that network sampling can result in the reported prevalence of forced labour being higher for self-responses relative to proxy responses.<sup>100</sup> This has been observed for forced labour experiences in the 2017 Global Estimates of Modern Slavery (2017 GEMS) and may be because respondents tend to know more about their own experiences, or because they exaggerate their own experiences while understating the experiences of family members.<sup>101</sup> It is well established that response errors can be caused by memory lapses.<sup>102</sup> An omission error, where the respondent fails to remember an event considered as forced labour, is rare when self-reporting but is more likely when reporting on behalf of family members.<sup>103</sup> Factors such as social stigma also affect the rate of omissions.<sup>104</sup> As such, self-responses are taken to be more reliable and accurate than proxy responses.

To counter the bias introduced by the inclusion of proxy responses, more importance was given to self-responses relative to proxy responses through weighting, with weights calculated separately for each type of response. The methodology for adjusting for bias resulting from response type is based on the 2017 GEMS methodology.<sup>105</sup> To give more importance to self-responses relative to proxy responses, the parameter of alpha is used to make final adjustments to the sample weights. The value of alpha may be interpreted as the odds of detecting a victim of forced labour, forced recruitment, or abduction based on self-response against the odds of detection based on proxy response. The odds ratio calculated from the raw data of the national surveys in South Sudan gives  $\alpha=0.75$  and in North-east Nigeria  $\alpha=0.58$ . It was decided to use the same adjustment factor for both survey sites by averaging the alpha for South Sudan and North-east Nigeria. In both the South Sudan and North-east Nigeria datasets, sampling weights of self-responses are adjusted by  $\alpha=0.665$  and proxy responses are adjusted by  $1-\alpha$ . The final adjustments by response type were therefore calculated as follows:

$$w_{self} = \alpha \times w_i$$

$$w_{proxy} = (1 - \alpha) \times w_i$$

Where  $w_{self}$  is the final weight for individuals that reported on their own experiences

$w_{proxy}$  is the final weight for individuals whose experiences were reported by a family member

$\alpha$  is the value of 0.665

$w_i$  are the individual-level base weights

## REFERENCE PERIOD

The results presented, including the prevalence rate of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions, are based on a five-year flow. This refers to the proportion of people who were victims of these forms of exploitation “at any point in the last five years,” regardless of the duration of the episode of exploitation – as opposed to the stock, which presents the average number of victims at any given moment. Stock and flow estimates are related to each other through the length of time, or duration, that a victim is in slavery. For example, if four people are in forced labour for three months, one after the other, those four people have been in forced labour over the year but on average there was only one person in forced labour during the year.

Data collection across the three countries occurred over 11 months. As a result, the dates of the five-year period, or reference period, on which the flow estimate are based vary by survey country. In South Sudan, the reference period is September 2012 to September 2017, whereas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo the reference period is November 2012 to February 2018, and in North-east Nigeria the reference period is July 2013 to October 2018. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and North-east Nigeria, the data collection period lasted several months and thus the reference period is slightly longer than five years.

A case of slavery-related abuse was considered to have occurred within the reference period if it was ongoing at any point during that period, regardless of whether the slavery-related abuse commenced or ceased outside of the reference period.

## MORTALITY RATE

The crude mortality rate is calculated as the number of deaths in a given period divided by the population exposed to risk of death in that period. It was calculated among IDPs and their families as follows:

*Crude mortality rate*

$$= \frac{n^{deaths}}{\text{mid – displacement population}} \times \frac{1,000}{\text{Average number of months displaced}}$$

Where

$$\text{mid – displacement population} = n^{living} + \frac{1}{2} n^{deaths} - \frac{1}{2} n^{births}$$

$n^{deaths}$  is the number of death in network sample since displacement

$n^{living}$  is the number of living persons in network sample at the time of survey

$n^{births}$  is the number of live births in the network sample since displacement

To compute crude mortality rates over a given period (say, since displacement) one needs to know the population at midpoint. We estimate the population at midpoint by adding half of the deaths and by subtracting half of the live births from the population at the time of survey. As we do not know the exact date of birth of proxy respondents in the sample – only their age in completed years was recorded – we estimated the number of live births since displacement by counting the number of individuals for whom the age at the time of survey in completed years was smaller or equal than the number of completed years since displacement.

For instance, if a family was displaced in June 2016 and the survey was conducted in December 2017, the number of completed years in displacement is 1. Everyone in the network sample for this family who is older than 1 will be considered to have been born *before* displacement. Everyone who is 1 or below will be considered to have been born since displacement. Such an estimate of the number of live births is a conservative one. Since the number of live births is subtracted in the denominator, using a conservative estimate of live birth means that the crude mortality rate is a lower bound of the true rate. We use the mean duration of displacement in months in the sample as the period of reference.

## Ethical considerations

Ethical and operational safeguards were adopted to minimize the risks associated with conducting research activities in conflict-affected contexts where a humanitarian response is active, in addition to those related to the high sensitivity of the subject of this research. The research design, data collection, and analysis activities were conducted according to humanitarian and protection information management principles, including, first and foremost, *do no harm*.

According to this principle, any activity, including research and information gathering, must be preceded by a risk assessment. All possible steps must be taken to mitigate and minimize risks and negative short – or long-term consequences impacting all stakeholders, which include the affected population, the respondents, and the staff involved at the various stages of the research activity, from data collection to analysis and dissemination.

Great attention was given, during the research planning phase and its implementation, to designing tools and operational protocols that would guarantee the safety and security of all involved stakeholders, to avoid causing psychological distress, and to prevent respondents from re-living their trauma if prompted to disclose sensitive information.

The selection of the sites and the visit to each location were agreed with local humanitarian actors, particularly those involved in camp-management and protection, in order to coordinate the operations and conduct outreach activity with the population prior to the data collection exercise. Moreover, data collection was conducted after mapping existing referral pathways and mechanisms and setting up referral protocols for each individual context. This allowed for rapid follow up in case an issue emerged during the interaction with respondents.

Existing DTM data collection teams were used, comprising experienced, local interviewers, familiar with the context and fluent in the local language. They received thorough trainings on the specific data collection activity, the central concepts that the research targeted, content and methodology, and on more broad qualitative and quantitative research methods and techniques. Interviewers also received specific training on how to collect data on sensitive topics in challenging contexts based on protection information management principles such as *do no harm*. As IDPs' residences are typically small and densely packed, there was a risk that people from the household or from neighbouring residences could hear what the respondents said. Interviewers were trained to assess the level of privacy of the setting and private venues were organized for conducting the interviews a separate IDP site building if needed. The training also included psychological first aid orientation, conducted with the support of local protection actors. The well-being of interviewers and respondents was also monitored through interviewer debriefs.

Respondents were asked to provide informed consent and were reminded of their freedom to leave the conversation, opt not to answer, or skip sensitive questions at any stage. While sex matching of the interviewer and the respondent was not deemed necessary in any survey location, sex balance within the interviewer team was ensured and, as mentioned above, great care was given to ensure that privacy was guaranteed during interviews. Data were collected anonymously and stored safely in strict adherence to IOM data protection guidelines.

## Limitations

The results of this study should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind.

The findings from South Sudan are representative of IDPs living in PoC sites where official registration takes place. While this ensured we could use probabilistic sampling, it means the results cannot be generalized to IDPs living in transient sites or outside displacement sites. In North-east Nigeria, however, both sites and host communities are included, and results can be generalized beyond camps to host communities.

The methodology relied on face-to-face interviews and is vulnerable to under-reporting. The issues are sensitive, and respondents may have felt wary of disclosing such private and potentially dangerous information to interviewers. The gender of interviewers may also have impacted the accuracy of responses where respondents did not feel comfortable disclosing to interviewers of a particular gender. This is especially true of questions related to armed groups and armed forces as well as to questions surrounding sexual exploitation. In addition, cultural norms may lead to normalization of the acts the study aimed to measure. Forced marriage is a case in point as people often did not see forced marriages as such. Violence could also become normalized in the conflict-affected contexts in which IDPs live, resulting in under-reporting of violent events.

Under-reporting of instances of exploitation related to armed groups and armed forces, due to fear of reprisals or community stigmatization, is likely to be a problem for all three survey locations. However, there is reason to believe it could impact results for North-east Nigeria the most. Numerous UN and NGO reports have noted that civilians known to have links to Boko Haram face high levels of stigma, ostracism, and rejection by communities.<sup>106,107</sup> Families have been noted to be unwilling to disclose any association their children might have had with the group.<sup>108</sup> Protection monitors have reported incidents of arrests of “suspected Boko Haram members” in or around IDP sites.<sup>109</sup> There have also been reports of children being arrested at IDP camps on suspicion of involvement with Boko Haram.<sup>110</sup> A related limitation is the potential under-reporting of the exploitation of children due to possible aspects of “shame” regarding the respondents’ roles as guardians and because of fear of reprisals regarding children’s involvement with armed groups.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, the selection of primary respondents within the household was non-random due to the decision by field teams to invite the head of household, as nominated by present household members, to act as the primary respondent. As a result, 79 per cent of primary respondents in South Sudan were female, as were 76 per cent of primary respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The use of the network sample approach means that greater demographic diversity is introduced through inclusion of family members. Nonetheless, while poststratification was used to adjust for under-coverage by sex in South Sudan, bias is likely introduced into the prevalence estimates for South Sudan since more weight is given to primary respondents. Therefore, while primary respondents make up a smaller proportion of the sample than proxy responses, the prevalence rates may be skewed towards experiences of female IDPs in South Sudan. Since weights are not applied to the Democratic Republic of the Congo dataset, this issue is not applicable to the Democratic Republic of the Congo results.

Non-response was not captured during data collection and therefore adjustment of the weights to account for non-response could not be performed. As a result, it is not known to what extent bias has been introduced due to non-response.

The adjustment of weights based on self or proxy response was made to counteract bias introduced by memory failures. To better address bias resulting from the inclusion of proxy responses in surveys among hard-to-reach populations, research on precision of and bias introduced by the inclusion of proxy responses in estimating prevalence of exploitation in humanitarian settings, including by evaluating promising approaches to addressing these, would provide significant value to the research community and the wider humanitarian sector.



Jerry cans at the camp taps in a displacement camp in South Sudan, March 2012. While all States have been impacted by the crisis, most IDPs are located in the states of Central Equatoria, Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei, largely in spontaneous or informal sites or with host communities. Photo credit: Tom Stoddart via Getty Images.


# Forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abductions and disappearances

The following section presents estimates of prevalence of three forms of slavery-related abuse experienced by IDPs residing in PoC sites in South Sudan and displacement sites in North-east Nigeria during the reference period: forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups and forces, and abductions. Prevalence estimates are not provided for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, summary statistics on the experiences of these slavery-related abuses among sampled individuals are presented. While the extent of slavery-related abuse cannot be generalized to the overall IDP population in displacement sites in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the results nonetheless provide valuable insights for policy makers. The characteristics of all three forms of slavery-related abuse, such as means of coercion, type of work, and perpetrator, are presented for each country.

## South Sudan

Just over 5 per cent (5.3%) of IDPs in South Sudan who were displaced in PoC sites are estimated to have experienced some form of slavery-related abuse during the reference period. Recruitment into armed forces or groups is estimated to have been experienced by 3.1 per cent of IDPs in PoC sites and was the most common form of slavery-related abuse during the reference period, as presented in Figure 1. This includes those who were forcefully recruited before September 2012 but were still in the situation of forced recruitment between September 2012 and September 2017. An estimated 2.5 per cent of IDPs in PoC sites were abducted or disappeared during the reference period. During the same period, forced labour is estimated to have been experienced by 2 per cent of the IDP population in PoC sites.

Figure 1. Estimated prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions among IDPs in PoC sites in South Sudan during the reference period, by sex






Breakdowns by sex, as presented in Figure 1, suggest that male IDPs in PoC sites experienced higher rates of forced recruitment and abductions or disappearances, with the difference in rate by sex most apparent for forced recruitment (5.5% of males compared with 1.4% of females). This supports existing evidence on forced recruitment in conflict-affected areas, which indicates that males are disproportionately impacted by forced recruitment.<sup>111</sup> Conversely, more females than males were estimated to have experienced forced labour during the reference period. An estimated 2.2 per cent of female IDPs experienced forced labour during the reference period compared with 1.7 per cent of males. This may be explained by the disproportionate vulnerability of women and girls, especially IDPs or those from rural areas, to domestic servitude and sexual exploitation.<sup>112</sup>


Age breakdowns of the estimated prevalence of each form of slavery-related abuse are presented in Figure 2. Compared to other age groups, those aged 35 to 49 experienced much higher rates of forced labour and forced recruitment during the reference period. Children aged 5 to 17 years were the least affected group during this period, and this is true for all forms of slavery-related abuse assessed. Those aged 50 and over had slightly higher rates of abductions. It is worth noting that the prevalence rate of forced recruitment is very low for children below 18 years of age. While there is limited evidence available on the forced recruitment of adults, it was noted in 2015 that recruitment efforts by the armed forces were mainly targeting adults, though children were also recruited.<sup>113</sup>

Figure 2. Estimated prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions among IDPs in PoC sites in South Sudan during the reference period, by age groups



Breakdowns of estimates of each form of slavery-related abuse by sex among children (aged 5 to 17 years) are presented in Figure 3 and show that the prevalence of abductions or disappearances is twice as high for girls than boys (0.4% cf 0.2%). Girls also experienced forced labour at higher rates than boys (0.3% cf 0.2%). The largest difference in prevalence rates between boys and girls was observed for forced recruitment into armed forces and armed groups, for which the prevalence rate is 0.4 per cent for boys and 0.1 per cent for girls in IDP sites in South Sudan.

Figure 3. Estimated prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions among IDPs aged 5 to 17 year in PoC sites in South Sudan during the reference period, by sex



**FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH FORCED LABOUR, FORCED RECRUITMENT AND ABDUCTIONS**

Logistic regression analysis was used to assess the relationship between each form of slavery-related abuse and factors hypothesized to increase risk to or protect against them. These included individual factors: sex, age, marital status, and education, as well as external factors: size of the household, attacks on a person’s village prior to displacement, the number of assets owned by a household before displacement, and lack of aid prior to displacement. Relationship to the primary respondent was included as a covariate to control for the effect of relationship type on knowledge of an experience of slavery-related abuse. Results of the logistic regression model of predictors of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abduction in South Sudan are presented in Table 19 in Appendix A.

Of the predictors assessed, only age was found to significantly predict forced labour during the reference period among IDPs in PoC sites. Compared to children (those aged 5 to 18 years), the odds of experiencing forced labour during the reference period were around seven times greater for those in the age groups 18 to 34 years (95% CI [3.3, 16.7]) and 50 years and older (95% CI [2.1, 25.7]). The odds were much higher for those aged 35 to 49 years, with 15 times greater odds (95% CI [5.9, 39.0]) of experiencing forced labour during the reference period compared to children. The findings also suggest that those aged 35 to 49 years who experienced displacement had double the odds of experiencing forced labour of those aged 18 to 34 years (95% CI [1.1, 3.9]).


Age was also found to predict forced recruitment into armed groups or forces during the reference period by IDPs in PoC sites. Compared to those aged 18 to 34 years, the odds of experiencing forced recruitment into armed groups or forces during the reference period were 90 per cent lower (95% CI [0.04, 0.1]) for those aged 5 to 17 years and 71 per cent higher (95% CI [1.0, 2.9]) among those aged 35 to 49 years. Additionally, being male was found to significantly heighten the odds of forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, with males having 6 times greater odds (95% CI [3.4, 11.5]) than females. In terms of external factors that predict forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, attacks on a person’s village prior to displacement was found to increase the odds by 2.4 times (95% CI [1.5, 4.0]). Further, the odds of experiencing forced recruitment into armed groups or forces reduced by 9 per cent (95% CI [0.8, 0.99]) for each additional member in the household. Lastly, not having received aid prior to displacement was associated with lower odds (95% CI [0.5, 0.95]) of forced recruitment compared to those who received some form of aid. While this seems counterintuitive, aid is often channelled to where it is most needed and it may therefore indicate the lower need for aid, with close to 25 per cent of primary respondents indicating they came to the displacement site for reasons other than safety or feeling they had no other choice.

Age of IDPs in PoC sites was found to significantly predict abduction during the reference period. Compared to those aged 5 to 17 years who experience displacement, those aged 18 to 34 years, 35 to 49 years and 50 years and older had 4.7 times (95% CI [2.4, 9.0]) 5.5 times (95% CI [2.3, 13.2]) and 5.9 times (95% CI [2.4, 14.5]) greater odds of being abducted during the reference period. Additionally, males that experienced displacement had twice (95% CI [1.1, 3.5]) the odds of being abducted during that period compared to females. In terms of external factors that predicted abduction, attacks on a person’s village prior to displacement was found to double the odds (95% CI [1.2, 3.7]) of being abducted during the reference period. The results also suggest a modest (6 per cent, CI 95% [1.006 – 1.1]) increase in the odds of being abducted with each additional asset the household owns, for assets including electricity, electric appliances (such as radio, television, refrigerator, fan), landline and mobile telephones, and computers. While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without further information, this may relate to abductions for the purpose of ransom or access to wealth.<sup>114</sup>

**SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE BEFORE AND AFTER DISPLACEMENT**

Results based on the experiences of primary respondents (for whom dates of displacement are available) indicate that rates of slavery-related abuse before and after displacement varied according to the form of slavery-related abuse and are presented in Figure 4. For forced labour, most reported incidents (78.5%) took place prior to arriving at the displacement site, suggesting that PoC sites offer significant protection to IDPs. Most abductions or disappearances (61%) and forced recruitment (52%) occurred after displacement. This is partially supported by existing evidence that children in South Sudan are vulnerable to forced recruitment even after seeking refuge in PoC sites.

Figure 4. Slavery-related abuse occurrence before and after displacement in South Sudan during the reference period




## CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED LABOUR

As presented in Figure 5, respondents reported that the main perpetrators of forced labour were armed groups (41%), followed by armed forces (39%), family members (14%), recruiters (5%) and friends/acquaintances (2%). This generally supports existing evidence published by the UN Security Council (2018), which found that, of the recruitment of children perpetrated by armed groups or forces over a period of just less than four years between 2014 and 2018, 43 per cent were carried out by government security forces.<sup>115</sup>


Figure 5. Person or group responsible for forced labour among IDPs in South Sudan during the reference period

The forms of coercion used to keep people in forced labour are presented in Figure 6, illustrating that physical violence (44%) and threats of physical violence (29%) were the most frequently cited means of coercion that kept someone from




refusing or leaving a situation of forced labour. Threats against family was also a frequently cited reason, reported by 12 per cent of those who had experienced forced labour as the reason for the inability to leave.

Figure 6. Types of coercion used to force IDPs in South Sudan to work during the reference period



The type of activities people undertook while being forced to work are presented in Figure 7. Sixty-one per cent of IDPs who experienced forced labour reported activities directly linked with armed groups, including fighting (38%), and providing support services to armed forces or groups (21%). In addition to domestic labour (18%) and working in accommodation and food services (9%), sexual exploitation was experienced by almost 4 per cent of IDPs who experienced forced labour in the preceding five years.

Figure 7. Type of activity engaged in by IDPs in South Sudan while in forced labour during the reference period



**CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED RECRUITMENT INTO ARMED GROUPS OR ARMED FORCES**

As presented in Figure 8, most IDPs (90%) who were forcefully recruited into an armed group or the armed forces during the reference period were engaged in military activities. Other activities included fighting for an armed group (as opposed to fighting for the military), working in accommodation and service activities, and working in agriculture or forestry for an armed group or the armed forces.

Figure 8. Type of activity engaged in by IDPs in South Sudan following forced recruitment into armed group or the armed forces during the reference period





Figure 9 presents the types of coercion used to recruit IDPs in South Sudan into armed groups or forces during the reference period. The most frequently cited type of coercion was physical violence (41%), followed by threats of violence (31%), and threats against family (12%). Other types of coercion included, among others, being locked in working or living premises, being kept under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, and threats of legal action.


Figure 9. Types of coercion used to recruit IDPs in South Sudan into armed groups or forces during the reference period



**CHARACTERISTICS OF ABDUCTIONS OR DISAPPEARANCES**

Just over two thirds (67%) of abductions of IDPs in PoC sites in South Sudan in the preceding five years were by armed forces and more than a quarter (27%) of abductions were by armed groups. Figure 10 shows that far fewer abductions were at the hands of criminal groups or smugglers (3%), recruiters (3%), or some other person or group (1%).

Figure 10. Person or group responsible for the abduction of IDPs in South Sudan during the reference period



Findings indicate that those abducted during the reference period often also experienced forced labour or forced recruitment. Of IDPs in PoC sites who reported they or a family member had been abducted during the reference period, 33 per cent reported they had also experienced forced labour and 34 per cent had also experienced forced recruitment. It is worth noting that these figures appear to under-represent forced recruitment and forced labour co-occurring with abduction given the much greater proportion of reported abduction by the armed forces or an armed group. This may partly reflect a high number of deaths of those abducted as well as limited knowledge of what happened to a family member after they were abducted.



South Sudanese women and children collect water in Unity State, March 2012. Women and girls in South Sudan, particularly IDPs or those from rural areas, are vulnerable to domestic servitude and sexual exploitation. Photo credit: Tom Stoddart via Getty Images.

## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

As noted previously, the rate of each form of slavery-related abuse among sampled individuals cannot be generalized to those that experienced displacement during the reference period in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nonetheless, the following section provides important insights for policymakers.

One in five sampled individuals experienced forced labour, forced recruitment, or were abducted or disappeared during the reference period. Figure 11 presents the proportion of sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that experienced forced labour, forced recruitment, or abduction during the reference period. The most common form of slavery-related abuse experienced was forced labour, which affected 14.5 per cent of sampled IDPs. Abductions or disappearances were experienced by almost 10.9 per cent of IDPs sampled, and 2.3 per cent experienced forced recruitment into armed groups or the armed forces.

Figure 11. Proportion of sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that experienced forced labour, forced recruitment, or abduction during the reference period, by sex





Figure 11 also presents breakdowns by sex and shows that males were significantly more exposed than females to forced recruitment (4.7% cf 0.3%), abductions or disappearances (13.7% cf 8.8%), and forced labour (19% cf 10.7%).

Analysis of children (aged 5 to 17 years), however, found higher rates of forced labour and abductions among girls, though only slightly in the case of forced labour. Breakdowns by sex for children aged 5 to 17 years are presented in Figure 12. No girls were reported to have experienced forced recruitment during the reference period, compared to just over half a per cent of boys.




Figure 12. Proportion of child IDPs sampled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that experienced forced labour, forced recruitment, or abduction during the reference period, by sex



Age breakdowns of rates of slavery-related abuse are presented in Figure 13. Sampled IDPs aged 35 to 49 years experienced the highest rates of forced labour (26.3%) and abductions or disappearances (19.5%) during the reference period compared to other age groups, with those aged 18 to 34 experiencing the second highest rates for these forms of slavery-related abuse. In terms of forced recruitment, those aged 18 to 34 years experienced the highest rates during the reference period, followed by those aged 35 to 49. Across all these forms, children aged 5 to 17 experienced lower rates over that time compared to other age groups.

Figure 13. Proportion of sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that experienced forced labour, forced recruitment, or abduction during the reference period, by age groups



## FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH FORCED LABOUR, FORCED RECRUITMENT, AND ABDUCTIONS

Logistic regression analysis was used to assess the relationship between each form of slavery-related abuse and factors hypothesized to increase risk to or protect against slavery-related abuse. These included individual factors: sex, age, as well as external factors: size of the household, attacks on a person's village prior to displacement, the ownership of one or more assets by a household before displacement, and lack of aid received by the household prior to displacement. Relationship to the primary respondent was included as a covariate to control for the effect of relationship type on knowledge of an experience of slavery-related abuse. Results of the logistic regression model of predictors of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abduction in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, are presented in Table 41 in Appendix A.

Sex and age group were found to be significantly associated with experiences of forced labour during the reference period. Specifically, males had greater than three times the odds (95% CI [2.9,3.9]) compared to females. Compared to children aged 5 to 17 years, being aged 18 to 34 years or 35 to 49 years increased the odds of forced labour during the reference period by 4.9 (95% CI [3.6, 6.6]) and 4.5 times (95% CI [3.2, 6.3]), respectively. In terms of external predictors, having one or more assets like a television or computer, and attacks on the village prior to displacement increased the odds of forced labour by 66 per cent (95% CI [1.4, 2.0]) and 47 per cent (95% CI [1.2, 1.8]), respectively.


Sex and age group were also found to be significantly associated with experiences of forced recruitment into armed groups or forces during the reference period. Compared to females, males were found to have drastically greater odds (95% CI [14.4,44.0]) of experiencing forced recruitment during the reference period. Compared to children aged 5 to 17 years, adults aged 18 to 34 years and aged 35 to 49 years had 9.6 times (95% CI [4.8, 19.3]) and 5.5 times (95% CI [2.6, 11.6]) greater odds of experiencing forced recruitment during the reference period, respectively. Several external factors were also associated with experiencing forced recruitment. Compared to those without assets, having one or more asset increased the odds of experiencing forced recruitment during the reference period by 70 per cent (95% CI [1.2, 2.4]). Size of the household was also associated with slavery-related abuse, with a 14 per cent decrease in the odds (95% CI [0.8, 0.9]) of experiencing forced recruitment during the reference period for each additional person in the household. This may reflect the protection offered by a greater number of people being in the household compared to those living on their own or with few family members.

As with the other forms of slavery-related abuse, sex and age group were found to significantly impact the odds of being abducted during the reference period. Males had double the odds of being abducted compared to females (95% CI [1.7, 2.3]). Children aged 5 to 17 years had significantly lower odds of abduction compared to adults, with the odds of abduction among 4.6 times (95% CI [3.3, 6.2]), 4.3 times (95% CI [3.1, 6.0]), and 2.6 times greater (95% CI [1.8, 3.7]), among those aged 18 to 34 years, 35 to 49 years and 50 years and older, respectively. External factors that increased the risk of abduction included living in a village that was attacked prior to displacement, lack of access to aid prior to displacement, smaller household size, and having one or more assets prior to displacement. Among these three predictors, the effect was largest for lack of aid prior to displacement which increased the odds of abduction by 73 per cent [95% CI [1.3, 2.3]) compared to those who had received aid. A higher socioeconomic status, as indicated by having one or more assets, was associated with a 20 per cent (95% CI [1.0, 1.4]) increase in the odds of abduction during the reference period compared to those with no assets.

## SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE BEFORE AND AFTER DISPLACEMENT

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the questionnaire included a question that specifically asked where the person who experienced forced labour was living when it commenced. Findings are presented in Figure 14 and indicate that, of those who experienced forced labour during the reference period, around half were residing in their village when it commenced and approximately half were residing in a displacement site.

Figure 14. Location of sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo when forced labour commenced




For forced recruitment and abduction, information on timing of the abuse relative to time of displacement is available for primary respondents only. These data indicate that 47 per cent of abductions occurred after displacement, 42 per cent occurred before displacement, and 11 per cent occurred during displacement. A large number of missing dates for the commencement of forced recruitment in the North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo sample means that similar analysis cannot be presented for forced recruitment.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED LABOUR

Among IDPs in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, information on characteristics of experiences of forced labour revealed a significant link to the conflict, with armed groups or the armed forces being involved in nine out of ten of cases (82% and 8% respectively).

The type of activities sampled IDPs were engaged in while in forced labour during the reference period are presented in Figure 15. Overall, three quarters (75.2%) of activities related directly to the armed conflict, including fighting, spying, portering, and support services to armed groups or forces. Of these, portering was by far the most frequent activity, which more than two thirds of forced labour victims were forced to perform. Other activities not directly linked to the conflict included agriculture, forestry, fishing (25%), construction (16%) and domestic labour (8%). Sexual exploitation in the forms of providing sexual services and prostitution was experienced by 16 per cent of those that reported forced labour. Sexual exploitation affected 41 per cent of the women and girls who experienced forced labour, compared with only a half a per cent for men and boys.

Figure 15. Type of activities sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were engaged in while in forced labour during the reference period



How an individual was coerced into a situation of forced labour tended to be related to violence, with physical violence being reported by more than two thirds (70%) of IDPs, a threat of violence by almost one fifth of respondents (18%), and sexual violence by 6 per cent. The threats were largely direct and personal in nature, although 1.6 per cent of respondents noted threats against family members.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED RECRUITMENT INTO ARMED GROUPS OR ARMED FORCES**

Nine out of ten of those sampled in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, reported that they were recruited through physical force, while 65 per cent reported that threats were used, and 5 per cent reported they were deceived. Seventy one per cent of respondents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo who experienced forced recruitment into an armed group or force were engaged in fighting (Figure 16). Portering (44%) and providing support services (44%) were also performed by a large share of sampled individuals who experienced forced recruitment. Spying, construction, domestic work, and agriculture were also among the activities following forced recruitment.

Figure 16. Type of activities sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were engaged in following forced recruitment into armed groups or forces during the reference period





Figure 17 presents the types of coercion used to keep IDPs from leaving a situation of forced recruitment into an armed group or the armed forces during the reference period. Almost two thirds (63%) of sampled individuals that were forced to join armed groups or forces reported that physical violence was used to keep them from refusing or leaving, while more than a quarter (27%) reported that threats of violence were used.


Figure 17. Type of coercion used to prevent sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from leaving a situation of forced recruitment into armed groups or forces



**CHARACTERISTICS OF ABDUCTIONS OR DISAPPEARANCES**

Just over 80 per cent of abductions were by armed groups, whereas armed forces were implicated in 2.4 per cent of cases and criminal groups in 8 per cent of cases (Figure 18). Among others reported to have abducted those in the sample, included criminals or smugglers (8%).

Figure 18. Person or group responsible for the abduction of sampled IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo



While in 9 per cent of cases of abduction it was not known where the person was taken, 91 per cent were known to have been taken to a location within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cases where the person abducted was moved outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo were fewer than 1 per cent. In almost all cases for which the location of the abductee was known, the person was taken somewhere in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 86 per cent of cases, respondents had no contact at all with the abductee. In 4 per cent of cases, people had contact with their abducted family member only once or very rarely, in 6 per cent of cases they were able to keep occasional contact, and in 4 per cent of cases they had regular contact.

Among those who were abducted and still living, it was reported that 44 per cent had also experienced forced labour in the reference period and 11 per cent had experienced forced recruitment during that time.



Men in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, carry sacks of maize in a United Nations World Food Programme compound. Photo credit: Eddie Gerald via Getty Images.

## North-east Nigeria

Among IDPs in displacement sites in North-east Nigeria, an estimated 1.7 per cent had experienced one or more forms of slavery-related abuse during the reference period: between July 2013 and October 2018. Figure 19 shows that the most common form of exploitation experienced was abductions or disappearances, estimated to have been experienced by 1.2 per cent of IDPs during the reference period. Forced labour and forced recruitment were estimated to have been experienced by 0.5 per cent and 0.4 per cent of IDPs, respectively, during the reference period.

As presented in Figure 19, the estimated prevalence of all three forms of slavery-related abuse were higher for males than females, with disparity particularly apparent for forced recruitment into armed groups or forces (0.7% cf 0.1%). The prevalence of abduction was higher for males (1.4%) than for females (1%), which may be partially explained by the high proportion of abductions for the purpose of service in armed groups or forces. This is explored in more detail in the following section.

Figure 19. Estimated prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions among IDPs in displacement sites in North-east Nigeria during the reference period, by sex






Figure 20 presents age breakdowns of rates of slavery-related abuse among IDPs during the reference period. IDPs aged 35 to 49 years were estimated to have experienced the highest rates of forced labour (1.4%) and forced recruitment (1.3%) compared with other age groups. IDPs aged 18 to 34 years were estimated to have experienced the highest rates of abductions and disappearances (1.8%).

Figure 20. Estimated prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions among IDPs in displacement sites in North-east Nigeria during the reference period, by age groups



While children (aged 5 to 17 years) were estimated to have experienced lower rates of forced labour and forced recruitment compared to those aged 18 to 49, the prevalence of abductions among IDPs was estimated to be higher for children than for those aged 35 and over. Figure 21 shows that boys are estimated to experience higher rates of abductions and forced recruitment but estimated prevalence of forced labour did not differ by sex during the reference period.

Figure 21. Estimated prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions among IDPs aged 5 to 17 year in displacement sites in North-east Nigeria during the reference period, by sex





## FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH FORCED LABOUR, FORCED RECRUITMENT AND ABDUCTIONS


Due to low case number of forced labour and forced recruitment, analysis of personal and external factors associated with assessed forms of slavery-related abuse was possible only for abductions. Univariate analysis revealed no statistically significant associations with external factors such as attacks on the village prior to displacement, possession of assets prior to displacement, or receipt of aid. In terms of individual-level factors, age appeared to be associated with risk of abduction, with those aged 18 to 34 having 2.9 times greater odds (95% CI [CI 1.2, 6.9]) of being abducted in the five-year reference period compared to those aged 5 to 17 years. Results of the logistic regression model of predictors of abduction in North-east Nigeria are presented in Table 30 in Appendix A.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED LABOUR

In Nigeria, few cases (n=38) of forced labour were identified. The information that follows on the characteristics of forced labour is unweighted and cannot be generalized to the wider population of IDPs in North-east Nigeria.

Of the sampled IDPs in North-east Nigeria who were in forced labour during the reference period, more than three quarters (76%) were physically forced into the situation, 16 per cent were threatened, and 8 per cent were deceived into forced labour. Figure 22 shows that the most common ways they were kept from leaving the situation were threats of punishment through the deprivation of food or other benefits and the use of physical violence. A large proportion of those who experienced forced labour were also threatened with physical violence or were deprived of food, sleep, or other benefits.

Figure 22. Types of coercion used to force sampled IDPs in North-east Nigeria to work during the reference period



Perpetrators of forced labour are presented in Figure 23. Armed groups were the perpetrators in almost half of forced labour cases (47%) and in 13 per cent of cases IDPs were subjected to forced labour by the armed forces. Almost a third (32%) of forced labour experienced by IDPs was attributed to parents placing their children into a situation of forced labour. This study did not gather additional information on the motive or context of forced labour perpetrated by parents and thus this finding requires additional analysis to better understand the motivation of parents.

Figure 23. Person or group responsible for forced labour among IDPs in North-east Nigeria during the reference period





Figure 24 presents the types of activities IDPs were forced to perform, with domestic labour the most frequently cited activity. This was followed by agriculture and forestry, which may account for the higher rate of family members who perpetrated the forced labour compared to other survey sites. IDPs forced to work for armed groups were more often engaged in support services to armed groups or forces than fighting or spying.

Figure 24. Type of activity engaged in by sampled IDPs in North-east Nigeria during the reference period




### CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED RECRUITMENT INTO ARMED GROUPS OR ARMED FORCES

In North-east Nigeria, few cases of forced recruitment (n=26) were identified. The information that follows on the characteristics of forced recruitment is unweighted and therefore cannot be generalized to all IDPs located in displacement sites in North-east Nigeria.

Almost two thirds of sampled individuals who experienced forced recruitment during the five years prior to the interview were recruited by physical force, 30 per cent were threatened, under 5 per cent were deceived, and 9 per cent were forcefully recruited by some other means.


Figure 25 presents the types of coercion used to keep someone from refusing or leaving a situation of forced recruitment into the armed groups or forces. Almost half (48%) of those who reported a family member had experienced forced recruitment during the reference period did not know how they had been kept from leaving the armed group or force. Of those sampled who were aware of how their family member was kept from leaving, threats against family (22%) and use of physical violence (22%) were the most commonly reported.

Figure 25. Types of coercion used to recruit sampled IDPs in North-east Nigeria into armed groups or forces during the reference period



As shown in Figure 26, respondents did not know what type of activity their family member who was forcefully recruited had performed in over half of cases (52%). Of those who did know the activity performed, the most common was fighting for an armed group or force followed by spying for an armed group or force.

Figure 26. Type of activities sampled IDPs in North-east Nigeria were engaged in following forced recruitment into armed groups or forces



**CHARACTERISTICS OF ABDUCTIONS OR DISAPPEARANCES**

The overwhelming majority (87%) of abductions that IDPs experienced during the reference period were perpetrated by armed groups. Many respondents spoke of attacks on villages by Boko Haram, leading to many members of the community being abducted at one time. This supports existing understanding of Boko Haram’s tactics, which have included abducting civilians during raids on villages or towns to coerce them into fighting or providing support,<sup>116</sup> attacking schools and kidnapping schoolchildren.<sup>117</sup>

*“During an attack in their village in Bama, she was kidnapped with her sister alongside a lot of other villagers and taken away.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of their daughter at age 6

Others spoke of abductions by unknown armed groups. Ten per cent of abductions were by the armed forces and 2 per cent of respondents did not know who had abducted their family member.

*“On our way to Dikwa an unknown armed group took him.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of their son at age 10

In most of cases of abductions (95%), those with family members who had been abducted had no contact with the abducted family member after the abduction had occurred.

*“The armed groups attacked [Signabaya] sometime in 2016 and abducted some of our children which we are yet to see or have any information about.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of their son at age 4

While many abductions occurred during attacks on villages, respondents reported that armed forced abducted family members from schools, mosques, in their homes, or while tending to cattle.

*“He was in Arabic school in Bama local government when Boko Haram came and took him away since then he was nowhere to be found. Please help.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of their son at age 11

Respondents also reported the use of threats of violence.

*“The armed group came to the house and ask him to follow them or they will kill them all in the house.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of their son at age 12

Some respondents spoke of release after days, weeks, or months.

*“He was kidnapped by men of the armed groups, spent two weeks in their custody before he was released.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of her husband at age 47

Others spoke of themselves or family members escaping the captivity of armed groups.

*“During an attack by an armed group, we were abducted and locked up in a confined space.*

*We spent about four weeks in captivity, after which we manage escape.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria on her abduction at age 25

It was not uncommon for movement to be part of the individual’s experience, with 61 per cent reporting being moved to another location in Nigeria, most commonly to Borno.

*“I was kidnapped by the armed groups when Bama was captured, I was taken to Sambisa by them.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria on her abduction at age 28

Of those who were abducted during the reference period, 8 per cent also experienced forced labour during the reference period and 12 per cent experienced forced recruitment. Given the high proportion of abducted family members with whom there was not contact after the abduction and the high proportion of cases that were perpetrated by armed groups or the armed forces, it is likely that many cases of forced labour and forced recruitment have been unaccounted for.



Nigerian civilians pass Chadian armed forces as they flee Boko Haram attacks in 2015. The Boko Haram insurgency has spilled across the Lake Chad region to impact not only Nigeria, but also Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger. Photo credit: Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images.

# Mortality and displacement

Respondents reported on deaths of family members that occurred since displacement. While information on dates of death and displacement tend to be patchy or inconsistent, it is possible to shed some light on the mortality rate in displacement contexts, on the causes of death, and on the experience of slavery-related abuse among persons who died since displacement.

The rates of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions were higher among the deceased than among the living IDPs and family members in the case of South Sudan only.

## South Sudan

### CRUDE MORTALITY RATE

In the South Sudan survey, 848 deaths were recorded since displacement, whereas the network of living family members was composed of 10,527 individuals. The estimated number of live births since displacement was estimated at 1,649. The Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) was estimated at 0.94 deaths per 1000 population per month. This is close to but slightly higher than the mortality rate for the general population of South Sudan in 2018, with a mortality rate of 0.87 deaths per 1,000 population per month.<sup>118</sup>


### CAUSES OF DEATH

Where the cause of death was known, the armed conflict was the most common cause of death, responsible for 39 per cent of deaths. Violence not directly related to the civil war was the cause of 14 per cent of deaths, bringing violent deaths to more than half (53%) of all deaths. Diseases such as malaria were responsible for almost a third (32%). Other causes were natural deaths and accidents. The largest proportion (28%) of deaths occurred among those aged 50 years and older, closely followed by the 18 to 35 years old (28% of the total) and by the 35 to 50 years old (27% of the total). The high representation of the 18 to 35 years old and of the 35–49 years old points to the role of violence in shaping mortality in the sample.

### PREVALENCE OF SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE AMONG THE DECEASED

Figure 27 presents the estimated prevalence of slavery-related abuse experienced over the five-year reference period by IDPs in South Sudan that are living and have since died. The estimated prevalence of any form of slavery-related abuse was almost three times higher for IDPs who had died since displacement compared those still living (13.7% cf. 5.3%). The estimates of modern slavery are higher among deceased IDPs in South Sudan for all forms of slavery-related abuse except forced labour. The difference was most marked among those who experienced forced recruitment, with an estimated 9.3 per cent of deceased IDPs having experienced forced recruitment in the five-year reference period compared with 3.2 per cent of living IDPs.

Figure 27. Estimated prevalence of slavery-related abuse experienced during the reference period by IDPs in South Sudan that are living and have since died



## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

### CRUDE MORTALITY RATE

In the North Kivu sample, 2,908 deaths were recorded since displacement, while the network sample of living members was composed of 12,940 individuals. On the restricted sample for which the year of displacement is known, there were 2,612 members of the network who had died since displacement and 9,146 alive members. The estimated number of live births since displacement was 2,295, meaning that the size of family networks decreased since displacement.

The Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) in North Kivu was estimated at 7.05 per 1,000 individuals per month.<sup>119</sup> This is considerably higher than the CMR estimated by Coghlan et al. (2009) for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as a whole, which was 2.6 deaths for 1,000 population per month, and higher than the CMR for the entire Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was 2.2 deaths per 1,000 population per month.<sup>120</sup> The study also found that the number of violence-related deaths was negligible, even in insecure Eastern Congo. In contrast, in our North Kivu sample, violence-related deaths accounts for almost half of all deaths (48%).<sup>121</sup>

## CAUSES OF DEATH


Of the known causes of death, the armed conflict was the most common, accounting for half of deaths. Violence not directly related to the civil war was marginal at less than 1 per cent. Diseases were responsible for 38 per cent of deaths, with 22 per cent from malaria alone. Suicides and accidents were responsible for 4.8 per cent of deaths and natural causes were attributed to 5.7 per cent of deaths.

Almost half (46%) of deaths occurred among those aged 50 years and older. Those in the age categories 5 to 17, 18 to 34 and 35 to 49 years old each constituted about 15 per cent of all deaths, while almost 10 per cent of deaths concerned children under 5 years of age. Women and girls represented 38 per cent of all deaths. The leading causes of deaths were not statistically different between males and females.

## PREVALENCE OF SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE AMONG THE DECEASED

Figure 28. shows the estimated prevalence of slavery-related abuse experienced over the five-year reference period by IDPs in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, that are living and have since died. The estimated prevalence of any form of slavery-related abuse is higher for living IDPs (21.1%) than for deceased IDPs, which is a product of the marked difference in the estimated prevalence of forced labour among living IDPs (14.5%) compared with deceased IDPs (8.6%). However, the estimated prevalence of forced recruitment and abductions that occurred during the five-year reference period is higher among deceased IDPs (3.3% and 14.2%, respectively) than living IDPs (2.3% and 10.9%, respectively).

Figure 28. Proportion of the IDPs sampled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are living and have since died that experienced slavery-related abuse during the reference period





# North-east Nigeria

## CRUDE MORTALITY RATE

In the North-east Nigeria sample, 327 deaths were recorded since displacement, while the network sample of living members was composed of 10,413 individuals. Of the restricted sample for which the year of displacement is known, the number of deceased members is 172 and 6,921 members of the network sample were living. There was a high proportion of members in the network sample for which the primary respondent did not know if they were alive or dead. These represented 13.5 per cent of individuals in the network sample and 16.4 per cent in the restricted sample. The following calculations of mortality rates do not include such individuals, and thus the 172 deaths are taken from a sample of 5,789 living individuals. The estimated number of live births since displacement is 903.

The Crude Mortality Rate in North-east Nigeria was estimated at 0.78 per 1,000 individuals per month.<sup>122</sup> This is lower than the mortality rate for Nigeria as a whole (1 per 1,000 individuals per month).<sup>123</sup> These findings, combined with findings of lower-than-expected counts of slavery-related abuse among living members of the sample, may point towards issues with data collection rather than reflect real trends and thus should be interpreted with this in mind.

## CAUSES OF DEATH


The armed conflict was the most common cause of death and was responsible for 36 per cent of death among those for whom the cause of death is known. Violence not directly related to the conflict was responsible for 19 per cent of deaths. Violent deaths, including deaths cause by the armed conflict, represented 55 per cent of all deaths in the sample. Diseases including malaria were responsible for 27 per cent of deaths. Suicides and accidents were responsible for 2.8 per cent of deaths whereas natural causes were attributed to 19 per cent of cases. The leading causes of deaths were highly sexed, with more than two and a half times as many males dying a violent death than females (59% of deaths among males compared with 22% among females). Conversely, death from natural causes was twice as high for females than for males (30% versus 15%), as was death from disease (43% of females and 20% of males).

Most deaths were of children (31%), followed by those aged 50 years and older (28%). Deaths among those aged 18–34 and 35–49 years each constituted about 20 per cent of all deaths. Women and girls represented 29 per cent of all deaths.

**PREVALENCE OF SLAVERY-RELATED ABUSE AMONG THOSE REPORTED DECEASED**

Figure 29 presents the estimated prevalence of slavery-related abuse that occurred among deceased and living IDPs in North-east Nigeria between July 2013 and February 2018. The estimate prevalence of abductions is twice as high among deceased IDPs compared with living. While the estimated prevalence of forced labour and forced recruitment is zero for deceased IDPs, it is highly likely that this reflects barriers to identifying these individuals through household surveys, including fear of reprisal and stigma, or a lack of knowledge about what happened to the person following abduction.

Figure 29. Estimated prevalence of slavery-related abuse experienced during the reference period by IDPs in North-east Nigeria that are living and have since died





A boy carries twigs at a displacement camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014. Displaced children in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, are vulnerable to abductions and forced recruitment. Most children who were forcibly recruited into armed groups or armed forces were boys. Photo credit: Jean Chung via Getty Images.

# Human trafficking and displacement

The survey was not designed to estimate the prevalence of human trafficking *per se*. Human trafficking has a complicated legal definition and has many possible manifestations, so including it would have meant having to lengthen and complicate the survey considerably.

Nevertheless, the results of this study make a substantial contribution to the evidence base on human trafficking in situations of armed conflict-induced displacement and highlight the need for mainstreaming counter-trafficking into humanitarian response, for the following reasons:

- All cases of forced recruitment identified by the survey meet the international legal definition of trafficking in persons, including cases of recruitment of child soldiers.
- The majority of cases of forced labour identified by the survey resemble and, in many cases, are likely to constitute, trafficking in persons. Such cases of forced labour involve individuals being recruited, taken by force, and moved from place to place for the purposes of exploitation by various perpetrators.
- The presence of abductions can provide an indication of the presence of some forms of human trafficking, as abduction can meet the first and second elements of the legal definition of human trafficking. However, cases of abduction do not meet all three elements of the human trafficking definition unless abduction is undertaken with the criminal intent to exploit the abductee. Many cases of abduction identified by the survey were reported to have happened to individuals who had also experienced forced labour or forced recruitment. Information volunteered from respondents also indicates that, in many of these instances, the abductions have actually resulted in forced labour.
- While human trafficking is a conceptually distinct phenomenon from forced labour, forced recruitment and abductions, it shares some important commonalities including being driven by a similar set of risk and protective factors. The results of the research show widespread prevalence of forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions, indicating an environment in which people are driven to become perpetrators and where perpetrators can prey upon vulnerable populations with relative impunity. This is the type of enabling environment where human trafficking is also likely to be taking place.

Viewed through this lens, the research findings indicate that certain forms of human trafficking are prevalent in the countries studied and are relevant for better understanding the phenomenon in situations of armed conflict-induced displacement. However, it should be noted that there are some manifestations of trafficking that the survey was not intended to target so the total prevalence of all forms of human trafficking taken together would likely be higher than prevalence figures reported for forced recruitment, for example.

## Further insights from the survey data


As mentioned above, although the survey does not directly measure human trafficking, it does provide further information that can approximate the extent of some forms of trafficking. Specifically, for each reported episode of forced labour, the respondent was asked whether the person was taken somewhere else to exert the activity.

### South Sudan

In South Sudan, by this measure, human trafficking may be associated with a substantial subset of cases of forced labour. In 15 per cent of cases of forced labour, the person was taken somewhere else to work, indicating this may have also constituted human trafficking. The vast majority were taken somewhere in South Sudan and six were taken abroad (four to Sudan, one to Ethiopia, and one to Uganda). Given that such cases would constitute only a subset of all human trafficking cases, the prevalence of all forms of trafficking would therefore be higher.

In terms of abduction, 6 per cent of IDPs in South Sudan reporting on abductions of their family members did not know where their abducted family member had been taken, 93 per cent reported that they were taken somewhere within South Sudan. The vast majority of those abducted and transported somewhere within South Sudan were taken to one of four states: Western Bahr El Ghazal, Central Equatoria, Unity, and Upper Nile (Figure 30).

Figure 30. State where abducted persons taken in South Sudan, among cases where destination was known



### North-east Nigeria

In 96 cases of abduction in Nigeria, the abductee was reportedly taken somewhere else in Nigeria and in four cases the abductee was taken abroad (the location of the abductee was unknown in 71 cases). Three people were taken to Cameroon and one person was taken to Egypt. This may give an indication that some forms of trafficking in persons are likely prevalent (the prevalence rate of this subset of the wider definition of trafficking in persons thereby being 2 per cent for males and 0.9 per cent for females out of all IDPs surveyed). More than four fifths of abductions were stated as being due to armed groups (82%), where armed forces accounted for 2.4 per cent of cases and criminal groups accounted for 7 per cent.

*“During an attack in their village, Ndono, [I was] rounded up by armed group and taken captive. [I was] taken captive and moved to Kumshe where [we] stayed for about four months and before [we] were released.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria on her abduction at age 46

*“She was kidnapped by men of the armed forces, and from there they moved them to an unknown location, then down to Madagali where her aunty saw her and recognize her after many of them were abandoned by the armed groups.”*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the abduction of their daughter at age 6

## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

While in 9 per cent of cases of abduction it was not known where the person was taken, 91 per cent were known to have been taken to a location within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cases where the person abducted was moved outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo were fewer than 1 per cent. In almost all cases for which the location of the abductee was known, the person was taken somewhere in North Kivu.

In 86 per cent of cases, respondents had no contact at all with the abductee. In 4 per cent of cases, people had contact with their abducted family member only once or very rarely, in 6 per cent of cases they were able to keep occasional contact, and in 4 per cent of cases they had regular contact.

*“...I don't know where my husband is.”*

Respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the abduction of her husband at age 58

*“I don't know, I don't know if he's still alive.”*

Respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the abduction of her husband at age 26

*“[I was] taken by force and then raped, sexually exploited, [and] transported.”*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her abduction at age 32

The data on abuse and exploitation before and after displacement are extremely limited, and hence it is not possible to draw any credible trends. Qualitatively, about half of cases started prior to displacement and the other half during or just after displacement. In terms of risk factors, it may be that individuals were most at-risk just prior to or during their displacement, which could indicate trafficking in persons, where the act of recruitment and possibly mobility was part of the trafficking experience and means of control used.

In some cases of forced labour and forced recruitment, victims reported being unable to leave their situation sooner because of the geographical distance from their home or, in extreme cases, they were locked up and had no freedom of movement. Such experiences are possible indicators of trafficking in persons, where the movement or lack thereof has been used as a means to the exploitation.

*“During an attack by [an] armed group, we were abducted and locked up in a confined space.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria on her abduction at age 25

# Recruitment of child soldiers and displacement

The recruitment and use of children as soldiers is prohibited by international law and is considered a war crime when it involves children younger than 15 years.<sup>124</sup> Respondents in the survey identified that children as young as 6 years of age were forcibly recruited into armed groups or forces during the reference period. Although their overall number was small, the information presented in this study on the recruitment and use of children into armed groups or forces provides further insights on the circumstances surrounding and the nature of the recruitment of child soldiers in IDP communities.

## South Sudan

Among internally displaced respondents who reported forced recruitment in South Sudan during the reference period, 19 per cent were forcibly recruited into armed groups or armed forces as children. Despite the criminalization of the recruitment and use of child soldiers,<sup>125</sup> UNICEF estimated that approximately 19,000 children had been recruited into armed groups and armed forces in South Sudan since the beginning of the civil war in 2013.<sup>126</sup> Children in South Sudanese refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan have also been targeted for recruitment by armed groups or forces in South Sudan.<sup>127</sup>

Children in South Sudan are recruited to increase numbers within armed groups or forces when conflict escalates or when new armed groups form.<sup>128</sup> Having faced multiple civil wars and protracted conflict,<sup>129</sup> the year of recruitment reported by South Sudanese respondents notably spans decades. More than half (56%) of those recruited as children were recruited between 2013 and 2016, coinciding with the breakout of the third civil war in December 2013,<sup>130</sup> while 37.5 per cent were recruited between 1983 and 2003, corresponding with the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005).<sup>131</sup> Almost a quarter (24%) of those taken as children were still with the armed group or armed force at the time of interview.

Consistent with existing evidence on child recruitment in South Sudan,<sup>132</sup> those who were recruited as children were primarily boys (97%). However, girls are also forcibly recruited into both combat and non-combat roles or are married to soldiers. Despite this, there are concerns that reintegration programmes for former child soldiers are largely focused on boys and do not sufficiently support the needs of girls, preventing girls from fully reintegrating into their communities.<sup>133</sup>

Means of recruiting children into armed groups or armed forces predominantly included physical violence (44%), threats of violence (23%), and threats against family (17%). However, other methods reported included keeping children under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, locking or threatening to lock children in work or living quarters, threat of legal action, threat of dismissal, or facilitation by family or relatives. Available evidence indicates that children are often targeted for forced recruitment at their houses, schools,<sup>134</sup> or on the street,<sup>135</sup> though some children voluntarily join armed groups or forces due to poverty, because their parents had been killed, or to defend their communities.<sup>136</sup>

Among respondents who reported the forced recruitment of children, almost all reported that children were forced to engage in fighting and other military services (96%). Former child soldiers have described the harsh conditions perpetrated by armed groups or forces, including abusive training techniques and physical punishments that included beatings, confinement, or making children stand in the sun for long periods of time.<sup>137</sup> Other evidence suggests that approximately half of South Sudanese child recruits carry out support roles such as cooking, portering, spying, or bodyguarding.<sup>138</sup>

## North-east Nigeria

Among Nigerian respondents, few cases of forced recruitment of children were identified. This may reflect the difficulty in collecting accurate data on recruitment of child soldiers given that Boko Haram, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), and the Nigerian Security Forces have all been identified in the recruitment and use of children throughout the ongoing conflict in North-east Nigeria.<sup>139</sup>

Despite the low numbers reported, both boys and girls were identified as being forcibly recruited into armed groups or armed forces. While existing evidence of child recruitment in North-east Nigeria suggests that boys are disproportionately vulnerable, girls are particularly targeted for abductions by Boko Haram for purposes of forced marriage or to carry out suicide attacks.<sup>140</sup>

Methods of recruitment reported among respondents included taking children by force or the use of threats. Some respondents indicated that their family members had been abducted by armed groups or armed forces, a method of recruitment most commonly deployed by Boko Haram, though abductions perpetrated by the CJTF have also been reported.<sup>141</sup>

*"[The armed groups/forces] kidnapped him by force."*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria, on the recruitment of their son at age 8

Some respondents indicated that family members had forced children into recruitment. Up until 2017, families and communities in North-east Nigeria had at times encouraged children to join the CJTF to defend their neighbourhoods against Boko Haram. All identified children associated with the CJTF were from communities frequently attacked by Boko Haram.<sup>142</sup>

*"He was force[d] by his uncle."*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the recruitment of his brother at age 15

*"Her husband join[ed] armed groups and took her by force."*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the recruitment of their daughter at age 15

In September 2017, the CJTF signed an action plan committing to put measures in place to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children. UNICEF reported in May 2019 that since the signing of the plan, 1,727 children and young people had been released, and that there had been no new recruitment of children by the CJTF.<sup>143</sup>

Existing information indicates that armed groups and armed forces in North-east Nigeria force children to engage in activities such as armed combat, suicide bombing, carrying explosive devices, spying, manning checkpoints, patrolling, bodyguarding, delivering messengers, cleaning, or cooking.<sup>144</sup> Findings revealed that individuals who were recruited into armed groups or forces as children were not necessarily engaged in fighting but were involved in activities such as agriculture and forestry. Many respondents reported they did not know what activities their family members were forced to perform when recruited as children.

Child recruits in North-east Nigeria, including those who had escaped, have been detained by authorities for associating with Boko Haram. For instance, in July 2017, more than 80 children who had escaped Boko Haram were sent to a military detention facility by the Nigerian Security Forces and detained for up to two years.<sup>145</sup>

Some individuals who were recruited as children remained with the armed group or armed force at the time of interview.

*"They capture[d] him on his way to farm and he is nowhere to be found up to now."*

Respondent from North-east Nigeria on the recruitment of their son at age 6



## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Among internally displaced respondents in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo who reported forced recruitment in the previous five years,<sup>146</sup> 22 per cent were forcibly recruited into armed groups or armed forces as a child. Although the recruitment and use of child soldiers is prohibited,<sup>147</sup> prolonged instability, particularly in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has propelled modern slavery practices, including child recruitment.<sup>148</sup> Between 2014 and 2017, the United Nations identified 49 armed groups or militias involved in the recruitment of more than 6,000 children.<sup>149</sup> While in recent years the number of new cases of child recruitment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has declined,<sup>150</sup> the majority of identified cases continue to occur in North Kivu.<sup>151</sup>

Reflecting patterns identified both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo<sup>152</sup> and globally,<sup>153</sup> most children who were forcibly recruited into armed groups or armed forces were boys (94%). Existing literature indicates that boys in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are also disproportionately recruited into combatant roles, though the use of girl combatants has been increasingly identified. In 2014, girls made up just 1 per cent of identified child combatants, rising to 34 per cent of child combatants in 2017.<sup>154</sup> Girls also face greater exposure to sexual violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage by armed groups and armed forces, though the extent of these crimes amongst boys is likely to be under-reported.<sup>155</sup>

Respondents reported methods of recruitment used by armed groups and armed forces included taking children by force (88%, n=44), the use of threats (58%, n=29), and deception (8%, n=4). Existing reports identify abductions as the most frequent recruitment method in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>156</sup> The data indicate that 45 per cent of those who reported forced recruitment of children in the preceding five years also reported they had experienced abduction in that period. Other sources claim that children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo may join armed groups due to poverty or a lack of opportunities, to defend their communities, or to gain a sense of empowerment.<sup>157</sup> Some children may also view joining an armed group or force as preferable to remaining in an IDP camp.<sup>158</sup>

*“An armed group came to our village and took all the young people, I was not spared.”*

Male respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on his recruitment at age 16

*“When they took me away, it was to make me join their group. When I said no, they beat me up terribly.”*

Male respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on his recruitment at age 15

Children who were recruited into armed groups or armed forces engaged predominantly in fighting and military service (76%), support service (48%), and portering (46%). Children were also reported to be engaged in construction (12%), spying (12%), domestic labour (10%), personal services (2%), and agriculture (2%). This contrasts with existing evidence that suggests most children recruited and used in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in recent years performed activities such as collecting water and wood, domestic tasks, collecting taxes, carrying belongings, and guarding checkpoints, as opposed to fighting on the front lines.<sup>159</sup>

*“[I was] forcibly taken to carry the combatants’ effects.”*

Male respondent from Democratic Republic of the Congo, on his recruitment at age 16

Children recruited into armed groups or armed forces in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo are also vulnerable to other grave violations, such as killing, maiming, and sexual violence,<sup>160</sup> with those children fighting on the front lines at greatest risk of being killed or injured.<sup>161</sup>

*“[He was] forced to join the armed groups, he fled after a few months, after being tortured.”*

Male respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the recruitment of his brother at age 14

A number of respondents indicated that those who were forcibly recruited as children managed to escape the armed group or armed force. However, 18 per cent of those taken as children were still with the armed group or armed force at the time of interview. Children who have separated from armed groups or armed forces, particularly children in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo<sup>162</sup> are at risk of re-recruitment. This is in part due to a lack of appropriate reintegration and rehabilitation services, as well as stigma that impedes children from re-joining their communities.<sup>163</sup>

*“They started to teach us how to use weapons and to rob people on the roads. We took advantage of this to escape. Now they come to look for us in the site, but we hide.”*

Male respondent from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on his recruitment at 17

Although the majority of children who separated from armed groups or forces fled, some children were captured by authorities. Rather than referring victims to support services, former child recruits have been detained by armed forces or police for associating with armed groups,<sup>164</sup> particularly those in opposition to the government.<sup>165</sup> Children are detained in correctional facilities, often in poor, overcrowded conditions without sufficient access to food. Reports of sexual abuse of girls in detention have also emerged.<sup>166</sup> Other less common means of separation from armed groups included the voluntary release of children, which was more likely for girls, or through surrendering.<sup>167</sup>

## Next steps in addressing the recruitment of child soldiers among IDPs in South Sudan, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

There have been notable efforts in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria in recent years to reduce and prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers. These efforts include convicting and punishing leaders complicit in these crimes, signing or implementing action plans to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers, the release of child recruits from armed groups and of children detained by authorities,<sup>168</sup> and the end of recruiting children within certain armed forces.<sup>169</sup> Despite this, the recruitment and use of children continues to be documented in each of the three countries,<sup>170</sup> and with the impacts of COVID-19 expected to exacerbate vulnerabilities toward child recruitment,<sup>171</sup> further action to address these crimes is critical.

In order to prevent conflict and promote sustainable peace, it is essential to protect children impacted by armed conflict.<sup>172</sup> Actors must ensure that former child soldiers have access to appropriate rehabilitative services and programmes to support the reintegration of children into the community. Such services are fundamental to helping children recover, disrupting the cycle of violence, and promoting peace and security in the long term.<sup>173</sup> Key elements to effective reintegration involve psychosocial and mental health support, educational and vocational opportunities, sex-sensitive programming, and long-term funding for programmes.<sup>174</sup> Governments must avoid detaining, arresting or punishing former child soldiers for associating with armed groups, ensuring it is only the recruiters who are prosecuted and the children are referred to the appropriate services.<sup>175</sup> Beyond this, governments should ensure that laws prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers and measures stipulated within the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict are enforced and perpetrators are held criminally to account.

## Forced marriage and displacement

The 2017 Global Estimates of Modern Slavery estimated 15.4 million people were living in a forced marriage in 2016.<sup>176</sup> Of those, 84 per cent were women and girls and 37 per cent were children (aged 17 and under) at the time the marriage took place. Further, 44 per cent of child victims were forced to marry before the age of 15 years. Rates of forced marriage were highest in the Africa region, with 4.8 victims for every 1,000 people in the region. Worldwide, there remains a gap in understanding of the extent of forced marriage at a national level. Further, the extent of forced marriage among specific at-risk populations, such as those impacted by conflict, is uncertain.

Alongside prevalence measures of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or armed forces, and abductions, this study also sought to shed light on the extent and nature of forced marriage among IDPs in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and North-east Nigeria. The current study identified fewer cases of forced marriage than would be expected among IDP populations impacted by conflict, likely reflecting the difficulty in identifying forced marriage through household surveys in these contexts.<sup>177</sup> Given the small number of cases identified in this study and the likelihood that this severely misrepresents the reality of the situation of forced marriage in these contexts, the information presented below cannot be generalized to the broader population of IDPs in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and North-east Nigeria. Nonetheless, information gathered on forced marriage in this study provides further insights into the circumstances surrounding and nature of forced marriage in IDP communities and help to inform policy. The following section describes the context and characteristics of forced marriage experienced at any point in the life of sampled individuals and is not restricted to the five year reference period, as with findings on forced labour, forced recruitment, and abductions.

There are many reasons for child and forced marriage, often closely linked to poverty, long-standing cultural practices, and beliefs about the roles of women and girls.<sup>178</sup> These are often reinforced and exacerbated by insecurity, limited opportunities for education, and conflict and other humanitarian crises such as natural disasters and public health risks.<sup>179</sup> For example, with girls more likely to be married early to ease household financial pressures, child marriages are expected to rise in communities economically impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>180</sup>

Young girls and women can also be forced to marry in exchange for payment to their families, the cancellation of debt, or to settle family disputes.<sup>181</sup> In some societies, a woman can still be inherited by the brother of her deceased husband<sup>182</sup> and a 2020 report highlighted that 20 countries have laws that permit men convicted of rape to have the verdict overturned if they marry the women they have assaulted.<sup>183</sup>

The prevalence of forced marriage, particularly of those that also constitute child marriage, can be higher in countries with significant levels of conflict or those experiencing humanitarian crises.<sup>184</sup> These circumstances can exacerbate existing human rights abuses or lead to new violations because of the breakdown in law and state authority. For example, there have been reports of women and girls in Nigeria and Iraq being abducted by armed groups and forced to marry fighters, enduring sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. Families who are faced with physical and economic insecurity may also see forced marriage as a way of alleviating poverty and protecting girls from difficult living conditions.<sup>185</sup> Displacement can also worsen vulnerability to child marriage for girls due to the erosion of social networks, the lack of other protection systems, and the risks of sexual violence.<sup>186</sup> Displacement in the wake of conflict also disproportionately affects food security for women and children.<sup>187</sup>

## South Sudan

In South Sudan, 65 per cent of respondents who reported forced marriage reported on their own experiences. Another 11 per cent reported that their sibling had been forced to marry, while 10 per cent reported on the forced marriage of a spouse and 10 per cent on the forced marriage of a child. Only 5 per cent reported that a parent had been forced to marry. The low rates of reporting on forced marriage of parents may reflect that experiences of parents are kept hidden from children. It may also indicate recall bias, as more recent forced marriages of siblings, spouse, and children are recalled more accurately.

Over two-thirds of forced marriages among respondents occurred prior to the eruption of the Civil War in 2013, while 20 per cent of reported forced marriages occurred in 2015 and 2016, coinciding with an increase in intensity in the conflict during those years. The data does not allow for verification; however this may relate to a rise in forced marriages when fears for safety increased, as exposure to armed conflict is associated with higher rates of violence against women and girls.<sup>188</sup> Six per cent of forced marriage were reported to have occurred after displacement.

The majority (86%) of respondents who had been forced to marry were female, resembling the sex breakdown of forced marriage globally. The average age at marriage for those who reported they were forced to marry was 18 years; 24 years for males and 17 years for females. Over half of respondents who were forced to marry were under 18 years at the time of marriage (56%), and 12 per cent were under 15 years of age at the time of marriage. Findings indicate that child marriage rates among those forced to marry are higher than child marriage rates among the general population. Specifically, the study found that 15 per cent of those that were forced to marry were under the age of 15 compared with seven per cent of the general population married under the age of 15. Marriage under 18 year was also much higher among those that experienced forced marriage, with 60 per cent of those forced to marry being under 18 years at the time of marriage compared with 45 per cent of the general population.<sup>189</sup> Additionally, a 2019 report by Oxfam identified child marriage rates among girls in one conflict affected town in South Sudan as high as 71 per cent.<sup>190</sup> Given the current study documented only forced child marriage and not all child marriage among respondents, child marriage rates among the respondents are likely to be higher than 65 per cent.

Among respondents in South Sudan, those most frequently responsible for the forced marriage were parents who were implicated in close to half (45%) of all reported cases. While reasons for parents forcing children to marry were not identified, anecdotal evidence indicates that forced marriage by parents in conflict zones in South Sudan is often driven by poverty and food insecurity.<sup>191</sup> In 19 per cent of forced marriage cases, respondents reported that their spouse was responsible, followed by 15 per cent implicating other family members, and 11 per cent reporting that friends or acquaintances were responsible for the forced marriage. Three per cent of forced marriages were forced by a member or members of armed groups or armed forces. The most common means of coercion for those forced to marry was threats against family (27%), pressure by family or relatives (20%), and physical violence (16%).

## North-east Nigeria

Among respondents in North-east Nigeria who reported forced marriage, most reported on their own experience (36%), followed by experiences of their spouse (32%), children (23%) and siblings (9%). Of the reported cases of forced marriage among respondents in North-east Nigeria, more than 80 per cent occurred since 2010, coinciding with the commencement of violence by Boko Haram. Of those cases for which both displacement year and forced marriage year were reported, 7 per cent occurred since displacement.

Eight in ten IDPs who were forced to marry were female (80%). The average age at marriage was 18 years – 17 years for females and 21 years for males. A majority of respondents who were forced to marry (61%) were under 18 at the time of marriage, 41 per cent were under the age of 15, and all were under age 30 at the time of marriage. When considering cases of forced marriage among female respondents only, the proportion of those married under the age of 18 years and 15 years increased to 75 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively. This supports existing reports of prevalence of child marriage in North-east Nigeria, with the 2018 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey reporting that the median age of marriage was 19.1 years for women aged 20–49.<sup>192</sup>

Parents were implicated in more than half (54%) of forced marriage cases and other family members in a further 15 per cent of cases. Several respondents who reported their parents or family were responsible for the forced marriage spoke of cultural expectations to marry at a certain age. The consequences of refusing a forced marriage in Nigeria are characteristic among tight knit communities where deviation from the established cultural practice is not tolerated – the consequences can include physical, emotional, and sexual threats and violence, with several media reports detailing victims being mutilated or killed for attempting to escape or refuse a forced marriage.<sup>193</sup>

*“It is in our culture that once a female child is up to 15, she will get married willingly or unwillingly.”*

Male respondent from North-east Nigeria on the marriage of his wife at age 14

Several respondents reported being forced to marry a cousin, a family friend, or other family relation. Consanguineous marriage is rooted in religious tradition and previous research has reported that those in consanguineous marriages in Nigeria do so to maintain or improve family unity.<sup>194</sup> One respondent who was forced to marry reported that it was to reduce the family burden.

*“My parents thought I was old enough for marriage and I needed to marry to reduce the family burden.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria on her forced marriage at age 16

Almost a quarter (24%) of reports of forced marriage involved force by a member of an armed group and of these but one occurred between the commencement of violence by Boko Haram in 2009–10 and the 2014–15 peak in Boko Haram-related violence. This supports existing evidence of the scale of forced marriage by armed groups, with UN estimates that between 2009 and 2017, Boko Haram subjected at least 7,000 women and girls to sexual violence, including through forced marriage.<sup>195</sup>

*“After being abducted by the armed groups, they got a husband for her. She refused but they threatened her.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria on her forced marriage at age 15

The militant Islamic group Boko Haram, which operates mostly in the northern states of Nigeria, has repeatedly kidnapped teenage girls who subsequently face sexual slavery and are forced to marry Boko Haram fighters.<sup>196</sup> UNICEF noted that since 2013 more than 1,000 children have been abducted by Boko Haram in North-east Nigeria, including the 276 girls abducted from a school in Chibok in 2014.<sup>197</sup> While most of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls have been released by Boko Haram, there are an estimated 112 girls that are still missing.<sup>198</sup> More recently, Boko Haram insurgents kidnapped more than 100 girls in Dapchi, Nigeria in February 2018. Most of the Dapchi girls were released in March 2018 but a few girls are yet to be returned to their families.<sup>199</sup>

*“When [armed group] kidnapped me, I was forced to marry one of the leaders.”*

Female respondent from North-east Nigeria, on her forced marriage at age 28

## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Among respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who reported forced marriage, most reported on their own experience (61%), followed by experiences of their spouse (12.5%), and siblings (11%). Fewer reported forced marriage experienced by parents and stepparents, which again may reflect a combination of recall bias and limited knowledge of forced marriage experiences of parents.

Almost 60 per cent of forced marriages experienced by respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo occurred in the 10 years prior to being interviewed (since 2007) and 29 per cent occurred in the five years before the interview (since 2013). More than half (56%) of the cases of forced marriage among respondents included data on both the year of displacement and the year of the forced marriage. Of these, 13 per cent of forced marriages occurred since displacement.

The majority of reported cases of forced marriage among respondents were experienced by females (85%). The average age at the time of the forced marriage was 21 years, with an average age of 20 years for female respondents forced to marry and 28 years for male respondents forced to marry. Forty per cent of respondents were younger than 18 years and 10 per cent were younger than 15 years at the time they were forced to marry. For female forced marriage victims, the proportion aged under 18 years and 15 years increased to 45 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. The proportion married before 18 and 15 respectively are lower among those forced to marry in the preceding 10 years than for the overall sample of forced marriage cases, with 31 per cent younger than 18 at the time of marriage, and 5 per cent younger than 15.

Looking at child marriage more widely, UNICEF estimates that 29 per cent of girls are married before the age of 18 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while 8 per cent are married before the age of 15.<sup>200</sup> This may suggest that rates of child marriage are improving even among the most vulnerable. Regardless, child marriages persist at unacceptable levels despite amendments to the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Family Code in 2016 that increased the legal age of marriage for girls to 18 years.<sup>201</sup>

Among respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed groups were most frequently reported to be responsible for the forced marriage (27%), followed by a spouse (24%), and then parents (19%) and other family members (14%). The results appeared to confirm prior research on forced marriage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which indicated there are four common ways that forced marriage victims, usually women and girls, are forced to marry: by rape, by sale (bride price), by kidnapping, and by child marriage.<sup>202</sup>

While bride price was not mentioned by the respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who had experienced forced marriage, prior research indicates that financial gain (bride price) motivates parents to force their daughters into marriage. Once the bride price has been paid to the woman's family, she is economically and socially obliged to remain with her husband, making it difficult to leave the marriage.<sup>203</sup>

Of the respondents who reported forced marriage by a member of an armed group, many reported they feared death if they refused.

*"We were in the field when the rebels came and forced me to become the wife of their leader; I had refused but I couldn't because I was afraid of dying."*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 29

Rape and sexual violence were also common experiences among those forced to marry by armed groups. Forced marriage in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo occurs in the context of extremely high levels of sexual violence against women due to the ongoing conflict, which has been described as the "worst in the world".<sup>204</sup> A 2011 study estimated that 1.69 to 1.80 million women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported having been raped in their life time; women in North Kivu were significantly more likely to report all types of sexual violence as compared with women in Kinshasa.<sup>205</sup> As recently noted by the UN Human Rights Committee, sexual violence is used as a weapon of war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's conflict areas, both by armed groups and in recent years also by the Democratic Republic of the Congo state armed forces.<sup>206</sup>

*"She refused but in vain, she was raped and whipped for this refusal."*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 14

Respondents also reported kidnapping as the means of forcing someone into marriage. Existing reports of abduction into forced marriage have noted that in some parts of Democratic Republic of the Congo, this can be part of a cultural ritual whereby the family arranges the marriage but the girl or woman is not aware and she is “captured” by her husband. Forced marriage by kidnapping is also strongly linked with the continuing conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where fighters or soldiers have kidnapped and then forced women into marriage.<sup>207</sup>

*“The arm group kidnapped me.”*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 15

Among cases of forced marriage that were attributed to a spouse, most involved rape by the husband-to-be, often with the assistance or involvement of his friends. Previous reports have recognized an increase in the incidence of sexual violence perpetrated by civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because of widespread impunity in conflict-affected regions.<sup>208</sup>

*“In our village, a boy was engaged to me, another was jealous and called five of his friends to force me to move into his home. We performed a sex act to make me dirty so my fiancé would not want me anymore.”*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 20

Respondents spoke of the shame associated with rape or sex outside of marriage and that the alternative to marriage was rejection by families and communities. Many spoke of being “unable to return home” because they had been “defiled.” Previous research in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (mainly South Kivu) has found that, because of traditional cultural beliefs, parents tend to force their daughter to marry their boyfriends if they are found to have spent the night with him or have become pregnant.<sup>209</sup>

*“By tradition, when a boy takes you by force, it is impossible to re-enter your home because you are already defiled.”*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 17

Rape was reported to be used as a tool to “soil” girls and women so that they would be undesirable to others. Respondents indicated that boys and men who had used sexual violence against them leveraged the shame associated with sex out of marriage, knowing that not only would it be likely that the girl’s family would not take her in, but that the fear of this rejection would keep the victim from leaving.

*“You arrive at the home of a boy, if necessary you [are] tied and are forced by their friends into sexual acts so you become undesirable for all others and you are forced to stay with your new husband.”*

Both male and female respondents saw the practice of boys taking women by force as a custom or tradition in their village. This is supported by existing literature on the forced marriage of women and girls in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (North and South Kivu) which indicates they are often culturally condoned.<sup>210</sup>

*“It’s the custom in our village, the boys take the girls by force. And they are forced to stay with them.”*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 18

Others reporting that other family members were responsible for the forced marriage spoke of being forced to marry the brother of their deceased husband.

*“After the death of my husband, they demanded I stay with my husband’s brother and I had no choice.”*

Female respondent from North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on her forced marriage at age 30

## Next Steps in addressing forced marriage among IDPs in South Sudan, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Reducing the prevalence of forced marriage globally will require a shift in the entrenched cultural norms that promote forced marriage, particularly in “tight knit” communities. This will need to involve a shift in women’s and girls’ roles and a granting of greater autonomy, as well as lessening the fiscal burden faced by families in order to prevent children being forced into early marriage for economic survival. It will also require greater representation of women in policymaking.<sup>211</sup> Women play a pivotal role in conflict resolution by anchoring peace talks on reconciliation, education, and other crucial elements of peace.<sup>212</sup> When women are involved, the likelihood that a peace agreement will endure for more than 15 years increases by 35 per cent.<sup>213</sup> Gender-sensitive policies can make peace more durable, in addition to reducing risk to modern slavery among women and girls.

The current work undertaken in the forced marriage space tends to focus on raising community awareness on human rights, the dangers of forced marriage, and the importance of education for girls in bridging the inequality gap. Efforts to do this have shown some progress in combating modern slavery.<sup>214</sup> Further, front-line organizations such as the Freedom Fund and their local partners have also made significant inroads into addressing the slavery of women and girls by adopting a holistic approach addressing the underlying causes of forced marriage.<sup>215</sup> Changing community values will be one key step to reduce forced marriage; however more work must be done to determine how effective these programmes would be in conflict-stricken regions, where the evidence suggests forced marriages are more prevalent.

Future research on the prevalence of forced marriage in conflict-affected communities should seek to remedy some of the barriers to identifying victims through household surveys, including by gender-matching interviewers to respondents, as well as seek to identify potential bias or inaccuracies during the analysis phase by coding for the presence of other family members during the interview process.



A soldier from the armed forces stands among the ruins of the Government Girls Secondary School Chibok in Borno state in 2016. Two years prior, Boko Haram abducted 276 adolescent girls from the school during the night. Many of the students are still missing. Women and girls are often abducted to be forcibly married to members of armed groups or armed forces. Out of forced marriage cases in North-east Nigeria, almost a quarter involved force by a member of an armed group. Photo credit: Stefan Heunis/AFP via Getty Images.



# Recommendations for humanitarian actors

## 1. Mainstream protection through the lens of slavery-related exploitation across the humanitarian architecture.

Stakeholders should consider:

- Activating the trafficking in persons in crisis sub-working group (under the Protection Cluster) in countries in crisis facing high levels of displacement.
- Deploying personnel with thematic expertise in addressing slavery-related exploitation.

## 2. Provide needs-based, protection-specific assistance in areas of high displacement to reduce risk factors and vulnerability to slavery-related exploitation.

- Ensure that multi-sectoral assistance programmes provide, where necessary,
  - access to legal counsel including assistance in making a report
  - tailored support for children
  - family tracing and reunification
  - shelter, food security and livelihoods
  - health care, including long-term psychosocial support
  - education
  - nutrition
  - cash programming
  - non-food items
  - timely information about available service provision and contextual dynamics
- Programmes should also ensure key preventative measures such as education and access to livelihoods are accessible to displaced populations and consider support for host communities.
- Create safe civilian spaces in areas of high displacement.
- Provide support, specifically in formal and informal settlement settings, including camps, to ensure family unity and safeguard against family separation.
- Ensure assistance responds to the specific needs of children, such as protection from child labour in humanitarian settings,<sup>216</sup> the availability of child-specific disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes,<sup>217</sup> and the provision of safe spaces and education for children.

## 3. Activate specific and safe referral and incident reporting mechanisms.

- Equip humanitarian response actors to refer suspected abuse and exploitation cases as well as ensure regular reporting.
- Establish emergency referral mechanism and protocols supported by specific resources.
- Camp management actors and authorities should ensure central, independent monitoring and reporting of incidents or attempts of forced labour, forced recruitment, forced marriage and abductions within formal and informal displacement settings, including camps.

#### 4. Provide foundational capacity-building to front-line humanitarian actors on key concepts and responses.

This should include humanitarian personnel, humanitarian–peace– development actors, civil society, and government.

- Provide specific thematic trainings to humanitarian sectors and clusters, such as Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), Protection, Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items (ES-NFI).

#### 5. Undertake strategic communications and awareness-raising with populations at high risk of displacement through a whole of community approach.

- Conduct targeted awareness-raising efforts to inform local populations about protection risks and community-based interventions that include education or interactive sessions on the populations' rights and responsibilities.
- Establish community protection structures formed of democratically elected networks.
- Develop accountability and feedback mechanisms for reviewing programming in order to actively seek and include the views of affected communities.

#### 6. Strengthen the evidence base on forced labour, human trafficking and other protection issues in humanitarian settings.

- Conduct regular and specific risk analyses.
- Integrate indicators to measure slavery-related exploitation within monitoring mechanisms and other data collection efforts to strengthen the evidence base (e.g. into protection monitoring tools, DTM).
- Provide regular thematic trends briefings to the international community (i.e. HCT, UNCT, HDPN actors) as well as other civil society and government actors.
- Undertake additional research to understand changing trends, risks, and population protection and assistance needs.

#### 7. Activate accountability and justice mechanisms for victims and survivors.

- Support national authorities to devise, implement, and enforce safe reporting channels for civilians and security personnel to report known or suspected human rights violations, without compromising the safety or confidentiality of the victims nor the individuals making the report.
- Establish and support safe reporting channels for humanitarian actors to express concerns and report known or suspected violations.
- Where necessary, Member States or Regional Organizations and/or International Treaty Organizations should deploy internationally sanctioned peacekeeping missions and support the deployment of human rights observers.
- Dedicate resources to ensure expert liaison and advocacy with national authorities on issues of site placement, options for relocation, processes of and justification of camp closures, as well as safe and dignified approaches to return which includes considerations of land rights.

#### 8. Implement the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children's recommendation of early warning and early-screening frameworks<sup>218</sup> for potential or imminent risk of trafficking, especially in managed camps.

## Conclusion

The number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence around the world is the highest it has ever been.<sup>219</sup> This has led to a large number of people becoming highly vulnerable to exploitation, with armed groups and armed forces ready to exploit their situation for their own gain.

Conflict and post-conflict environments are often characterized by the breakdown of law and order and fracturing of communities. Humanitarian assistance is extremely challenging due to volatile security situations and destruction of infrastructure because of armed conflict. These conditions are believed to exacerbate the vulnerability of displaced persons to numerous forms of exploitation.

This study is the first to provide estimates of the prevalence of certain forms of slavery-related abuse among displaced populations in Nigeria and South Sudan. The findings also contributed to the evidence base on the nature of slavery-related abuse in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Internally displaced persons sampled in this study were in PoC sites in South Sudan, in displacement camps in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in displacement sites and host communities in North-east Nigeria.

The study found that there is a failure to adequately protect displaced populations from forced labour, forced recruitment into armed group and armed forces, and abductions among the displaced populations surveyed in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that more effective protection mechanisms are needed to prevent slavery-related abuse before, during and after IDPs have sought protection in displacement sites.

In all three countries, most perpetrators of the abuses were parties to the conflicts, namely armed groups and armed forces, and the forms of abuse directly supported their conflict-related operations. Further, the means of coercion into these forms of abuse were often violent in nature. This points to a destructive cycle. Conflict results in displacement and a large pool of vulnerable people. With a failure to protect displaced persons, they are exploited by parties to the conflict in ways that support conflict-related activities. This in turn can fuel the conflicts, leading to further displacement and a continuing sequence of conflict and exploitation.

These findings highlight the need for urgency in ensuring that slavery-related abuses are prevented through greater awareness of the risks among vulnerable communities and the organizations and individuals tasked with protecting them. It also requires early detection of at-risk individuals and communities. While not all slavery-related abuse will be prevented, the early identification of victims through training and access to reporting mechanisms and referral pathways will improve rates of victim identification and rehabilitation. Lastly, continued data collection on slavery-related abuse in these contexts, including outside of displacement sites, and evaluation of interventions that aim to prevent and remedy these abuses, must continue and improve to ensure that the humanitarian response is timely and tailored to local contexts.

## Appendix A. Tables and figures

### South Sudan

Table 13. Demographic characteristics and displacement profile of the sample, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)		Missing (n)
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper	
Displaced at time of interview	99.1	99.3	13,175	82,463	0.1	99.1	99.4	11
Alive at the time of interview	93.6	95.7	12,454	79,526	0.2	95.3	96.0	5
Died since displacement	6.4	4.3	849	3,587	0.2	4.0	4.7	5
Self-response	14.5	30.8	1,928	25,572	0.7	67.9	70.6	0
Proxy-response	85.5	69.2	11,379	57,560	0.7	29.5	32.1	0
Sex								4
Female	49.0	55.0	6,519	45,719	0.6	53.8	56.2	
Male	51.0	45.0	6,785	37,403	0.6	43.8	46.2	
Age group								126
Under 5 years	12.0	10.0	1,583	8,223	0.3	9.4	10.6	
5–17 years	36.5	28.9	4,814	23,897	0.5	28.0	29.9	
18–34 years	27.6	32.7	3,639	27,032	0.6	31.6	33.9	
35–49 years	14.9	18.7	1,958	15,450	0.5	17.7	19.8	
50 years and older	9.0	9.7	1,188	7,969	0.4	9.0	10.4	

Table 14. Displacement experiences of primary respondents, South Sudan

Variable	Mean	SD	Missing (n)
Time since displacement (days between start date and 30/09/2017)	1,008.6	526.2	4
Time since displacement (years between start date and 30/09/2017)	2.8	1.4	4
Number of assets			0
Pre-displacement	3.4	4.1	
Post-displacement	1.7	2.3	
	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Attacks of armed groups happened in village before displacement	45.7	882	7
Household personally affected by attacks	83.0	732	128
Received aid before displacement	44.2	852	0
Frequency of attacks			128
More than once per month	27.0	238	
Almost every month	24.1	213	
A few times per year	21.0	185	
Once a year	15.3	135	
Once over a few years	12.6	111	
Consequences of attacks			278
Damage or destruction of assets	73.1	535	
Damage to the house	64.3	471	
Distress/anxiety/fear	52.7	386	
Physical injuries	51.4	376	
Loss of income	46.3	339	
Fear of leaving the house	39.1	286	
Reason(s) for displacement			0
Safer than other areas	70.8	1,365	
Services are better	13.6	262	
Closer to the residence	5.1	99	
No other choice	4.9	94	
I have friends and family here	3.6	69	
Other	1.9	37	
Closer to the markets	0.1	2	

Table 15. Prevalence of forced labour, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper
Living	1.4	2.0	147	1,413	0.1	1.7	2.3
Deceased	1.8	1.7	14	55	0.5	0.8	2.6
Sex							
Males	1.4	1.7	74	521	0.2	1.4	2.1
Females	1.3	2.2	73	892	0.2	1.8	2.6
Children							
Boys	0.2	0.2	6	27	0.1	0.0	0.4
Girls	0.3	0.3	6	34	0.1	0.1	0.5
Age group							
5–17 years	0.3	0.3	12	61	0.1	0.1	0.4
18–34 years	1.8	2.3	60	595	0.3	1.8	2.8
35–49 years	3.8	4.4	64	627	0.5	3.4	5.4
50 years and older	1.2	1.9	11	129	0.4	1.0	2.8

Table 16. Prevalence of forced recruitment, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper
Living	2.5	3.1	274	2,238	0.2	2.8	3.5
Deceased	6.5	9.3	50	298	1.0	7.2	11.3
Sex							
Males	4.3	5.5	223	1,667	0.3	4.9	6.2
Females	0.9	1.4	51	571	0.2	1.1	1.7
Children							
Boys	0.4	0.4	9	46	0.1	0.1	0.6
Girls	0.2	0.1	4	12	0.1	0.0	0.2
Age group							
5–17 years	0.3	0.2	13	58	0.1	0.1	0.4
18–34 years	3.7	3.9	124	1,017	0.3	3.3	4.6
35–49 years	6.8	6.3	115	907	0.6	5.2	7.5
50 years and older	2.4	3.8	22	255	0.6	2.5	5.0

Table 17. Prevalence of abductions, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper
Living	1.9	2.5	207	1,759	0.1	2.2	2.8
Deceased	6.6	6.7	51	214	0.9	4.9	8.4
Sex							
Males	2.3	2.9	122	885	0.2	2.5	3.4
Females	1.5	2.1	85	874	0.2	1.8	2.5
Children							
Boys	0.5	0.2	13	26	0.1	0.0	0.4
Girls	0.6	0.4	14	47	0.1	0.1	0.7
Age group							
5–17 years	0.6	0.3	27	73	0.1	0.2	0.5
18–34 years	2.5	3.5	84	919	0.3	2.9	4.2
35–49 years	3.8	3.6	64	517	0.5	2.7	4.5
50 years and older	3.4	3.7	32	250	0.6	2.5	4.9

Table 18. Logistic regression model of predictors of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abduction in South Sudan

Variable	OR <sup>1</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>	p-value	95% Confidence Interval	
				lower	upper
Dependent variable: Forced labour (n = 10,900)					
Sex (Reference: Female)					
Male	1.17	0.41	0.659	0.59	2.32
Married	0.68	0.33	0.430	0.26	1.78
Age group (Reference: 5–17 years)					
18–34 years	7.45	3.07	<0.001*	3.31	16.73
35–49 years	15.22	7.30	<0.001*	5.94	38.96
50 years and older	7.36	4.69	0.002*	2.11	25.66
Educational attainment (Reference: No schooling)					
Primary, secondary, or higher	1.57	0.49	0.142	0.86	2.88
No aid received	0.87	0.21	0.552	0.54	1.39
Number of persons residing in the household	0.95	0.05	0.323	0.86	1.05
Had assets prior to displacement	0.99	0.04	0.848	0.92	1.07
Village was attacked prior to displacement	1.51	0.49	0.202	0.80	2.86
Relationship to the primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Spouse/Partner	0.40	0.12	0.002*	0.23	0.71
Child	0.24	0.11	0.003*	0.09	0.61
Parent	0.19	0.11	0.004*	0.06	0.59
Sibling	0.37	0.16	0.021*	0.16	0.86
Intercept	0.01	0.00	0.000	0.00	0.02
Dependent variable: Forced recruitment by armed groups or forces (n = 10,900)					
Sex (Reference: Female)					

Table 18. Logistic regression model of predictors of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abduction in South Sudan(continued)

Variable	OR <sup>1</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>	p-value	95% Confidence Interval	
				lower	upper
Male	6.28	1.93	<0.001*	3.44	11.49
Married	0.53	0.19	0.077	0.27	1.07
Age group (Reference: 18–34 years)					
5–17 years	0.08	0.03	<0.001*	0.04	0.15
35–49 years	1.71	0.46	0.048*	1.01	2.91
50 years and older	0.90	0.36	0.797	0.42	1.96
Educational attainment (Reference: No schooling)					
Primary, secondary, or higher	1.46	0.34	0.107	0.92	2.32
No aid received	0.67	0.12	0.026*	0.47	0.95
Number of persons residing in the household	0.91	0.03	0.02*	0.85	0.99
Had assets prior to displacement	1.02	0.03	0.533	0.96	1.07
Village was attacked prior to displacement	2.41	0.61	<0.001*	1.47	3.96
Relationship to the primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Spouse/Partner	0.83	0.18	0.39	0.55	1.27
Child	0.27	0.09	<0.001*	0.14	0.53
Parent	0.51	0.20	0.09	0.24	1.11
Sibling	0.49	0.15	0.017	0.28	0.88
Intercept	0.02	0.01	0.000	0.01	0.06
Dependent variable: Abduction (n = 10,900)					
Sex (Reference: Female)					
Male	2.00	0.58	0.016*	1.14	3.52
Married	0.51	0.18	0.064	0.25	1.04
Age group (Reference: 5–17 years)					
18–34 years	4.70	1.56	<0.001*	2.45	9.00
35–49 years	5.53	2.46	<0.001*	2.31	13.25
50 years and older	5.91	2.71	<0.001*	2.40	14.52
Educational attainment (Reference: No schooling)					
Primary, secondary, or higher	1.76	0.51	0.052	0.99	3.10
No aid received	1.31	0.30	0.232	0.84	2.04
Number of persons residing in the household	0.91	0.04	0.061	0.83	1.00
Had assets prior to displacement	1.06	0.03	0.02*	1.01	1.11
Village was attacked prior to displacement	2.10	0.62	0.012*	1.18	3.73
Relationship to the primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Spouse/Partner	0.56	0.13	0.015	0.35	0.90
Child	0.14	0.06	<0.001	0.06	0.31
Parent	0.41	0.15	0.014	0.20	0.83
Sibling	0.32	0.11	0.001	0.16	0.62
Intercept	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.00	0.01

<sup>1</sup> Odds Ratio <sup>2</sup> Standard Error \*p<0.05



Table 19. Characteristics of forced labour, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)		Missing (n)
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper	
Type of coercion								2
Physical violence	36.5	44.0	58	616	6.7	31.5	57.3	
Threats of violence	23.3	28.8	37	401	5.9	18.6	41.6	
Threats against family	20.1	11.9	32	171	3.6	6.5	20.9	
Too far from home and nowhere to go	5.0	2.8	8	38	1.2	1.1	6.5	
Sexual violence	3.1	4.8	5	68	3.2	1.3	16.6	
Organized by family/relatives	3.1	2.4	5	34	1.7	0.6	9.1	
Pressured by family/relatives	2.5	1.7	4	25	1.0	0.6	5.1	
Kept under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol	1.3	0.5	2	7	0.4	0.1	2.1	
Punished through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	1.3	0.3	2	5	0.2	0.1	1.4	
Had to repay debt	1.3	0.8	2	11	0.7	0.2	4.0	
Threat of punishment through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	1.3	1.1	2	15	0.9	0.2	5.4	
Punished through fine/financial penalty	0.6	0.3	1	4	0.3	0.0	2.2	
Threat of being locked in work or living quarters	0.6	0.7	1	18	0.7	0.1	4.7	
Armed group	39.2	40.8	62	594	6.2	29.4	53.2	
Armed forces	27.9	38.7	44	563	7.5	25.2	54.1	
Family members	17.7	13.8	28	201	3.3	8.4	21.7	
Recruiter	12.7	5.3	20	77	1.6	2.8	9.5	
Friends/acquaintances	2.5	1.6	4	23	1.0	0.5	5.2	
Activities engaged in								2
Fighting	42.8	38.1	68	555	6.9	25.6	52.4	
Support services to armed forces	20.1	21.3	32	311	4.3	14.0	31.0	
Domestic labour	15.1	18.4	24	268	6.1	9.1	33.6	
Accommodation and food services	6.3	8.7	10	126	2.9	4.4	16.2	
Construction	3.8	3.0	6	44	1.3	1.3	6.9	
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	2.5	1.1	4	16	0.6	0.4	3.3	
Begging	1.9	0.9	3	14	0.6	0.3	3.5	
Prostitution/Sexual exploitation	1.9	3.8	3	55	3.0	0.8	16.7	
Wholesale and retail trade	1.9	1.9	3	28	1.6	0.4	9.2	
Other	1.9	1.9	3	27	1.1	0.6	5.9	
Arts, entertainment and recreation	0.6	0.6	1	9	0.6	0.1	4.3	
Personal services	0.6	0.2	1	4	0.2	0.0	1.8	
Spying	0.6	0.0	1	1	0.0	0.0	0.4	

Table 20. Characteristics of forced recruitment, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)		Missing (n)
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper	
Type of coercion								67
Physical violence	37.7	41.4	93	765	4.5	32.8	50.5	
Threats of violence	28.3	31.4	70	581	4.2	23.7	40.2	
Threats against family	19.8	12.0	49	221	2.2	8.2	17.1	
Threats of legal action	2.4	5.6	6	104	3.8	1.4	19.8	
Locked in work or living quarters	1.6	1.0	4	19	0.5	0.4	2.8	
Kept under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol	1.6	2.2	4	41	1.8	0.4	10.3	
Pressured by family/relatives	1.6	1.5	4	27	0.8	0.5	4.0	
Too far from home and nowhere to go	1.2	0.3	3	6	0.2	0.1	1.2	
Organized by family/relatives	1.2	1.5	3	29	0.9	0.5	4.9	
Other	1.2	1.0	3	19	0.7	0.3	3.6	
Sexual violence	0.8	0.6	2	12	0.6	0.1	4.0	
Threat of dismissal	0.8	0.5	2	8	0.3	0.1	1.9	
Punished through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	0.4	0.0	1	1	0.0	0.0	0.4	
Withheld passport or other documents	0.4	0.1	1	1	0.1	0.0	0.5	
Threat of being locked in work or living quarters	0.4	0.5	1	9	0.5	0.1	3.5	
Threat of punishment through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	0.4	0.3	1	5	0.3	0.0	2.0	
Armed forces	67.9	77.9	38	478	7.3	60.2	89.2	
Armed groups	28.6	19.3	16	118	6.7	9.1	36.2	
Criminal/smuggler groups	1.8	0.9	1	6	1.0	0.1	7.0	
Recruiter	1.8	1.9	1	11	1.9	0.2	13.2	
Activities engaged in								2
Military	84.4	90.3	216	1,691	2.0	85.6	93.5	
Participate in other military actions	10.6	5.5	27	103	1.4	3.4	8.9	
Engage in fighting	1.2	0.7	3	13	0.4	0.2	2.3	
Accommodation and food service activities	0.8	1.4	2	27	1.0	0.4	5.7	
Agriculture, forestry	0.8	0.7	2	13	0.5	0.1	3.2	
Provide support services to an armed force or group (e.g. cooking, fetching water, collecting firewood)	0.8	0.3	2	5	0.2	0.0	1.4	
Construction	0.4	0.3	1	6	0.3	0.0	2.2	
Other	0.4	0.1	1	3	0.1	0.0	1.0	
Spying	0.4	0.1	1	2	0.1	0.0	0.9	
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	0.4	0.6	1	11	0.6	0.1	4.3	

Table 21. Characteristics of abduction, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)		Missing (n)
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper	
Perpetrators of abduction								30
Armed forces	68.1	66.7	158	1,108	5.4	55.5	76.3	
Armed groups	22.8	26.9	53	446	5.1	18.1	38.0	
Criminal/smuggler groups	4.7	2.9	11	48	1.0	1.4	5.8	
Recruiter	3.0	2.8	7	47	1.9	0.7	10.0	
Other	1.3	0.7	3	11	0.4	0.2	2.2	
Taken to a location in South Sudan								0
Yes	91.2	93.1	238	1,838	2.7	85.7	96.8	
Unknown	7.3	6.0	19	118	2.6	2.5	13.7	
No	1.5	0.9	4	18	0.5	0.3	2.4	
State in South Sudan taken to								0
Unity	30.7	26.3	73	484	4.3	18.7	35.6	
Central Equatoria	29.8	27.2	71	500	5.7	17.4	39.8	
Western Bahr El Ghazal	23.1	31.4	55	577	6.3	20.4	45.0	
Upper Nile	13.9	13.8	33	253	3.8	7.9	23.1	
Jonglei	1.3	1.0	3	18	0.6	0.3	3.3	
Lakes	0.4	0.1	1	2	0.1	0.0	0.9	
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	0.4	0.1	1	3	0.1	0.0	1.0	
Western Equatoria	0.4	0.1	1	1	0.1	0.0	0.4	
Experienced forced labour in the past five years (aged 5 and over and still living)	18.8	33.5	39	589	7.0	21.4	48.3	
Experienced force recruitment in the past five years (aged 5 and over and still living)	20.8	33.9	43	596	7.0	21.7	48.6	

Table 22. Characteristics of recruitment of child soldiers, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number	Missing (n)
<b>Sex</b>			
Males	97.9	47	
Females	2.1	1	
<b>Type of coercion</b>			
Physical violence	43.8	21	
Threats of violence	22.9	11	
Threats against family	16.7	8	
Kept under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol	4.2	2	
Locked in work or living quarters	2.1	1	
Threats of legal action	2.1	1	
Threat of being locked in work or living quarters	2.1	1	
Organized by family/relatives	2.1	1	
Threat of dismissal	2.1	1	
Other	2.1	1	
<b>Living at the time of interview</b>			
No	75.6	31	
Yes	24.4	10	
<b>Still with the armed group/force? (among those still living)</b>			
No	75.6	31	
Yes	24.4	10	
<b>Activity engaged in</b>			
Fighting and other military services	95.8	46	
Other	2.1	1	
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles	2.1	1	

Table 23. Characteristics of forced marriage, South Sudan

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number	Missing (n)
Sex			0
Female	85.6	89	
Male	14.4	15	
Age at marriage			0
Aged under 15 years	12.5	13	
Aged under 16 years	32.7	34	
Aged under 18 years	55.8	58	
Type of coercion			0
Threat of punishment through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	27.9	29	
Pressured by family/relatives	22.1	23	
Physical violence	16.4	17	
Punished through fine/financial penalty	12.5	13	
Organized by family/relatives	12.5	13	
Threats against family	5.8	6	
Punished through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	1.9	2	
Sexual violence	1.0	1	
Perpetrators of forced marriage			0
Parents	47.1	49	
Spouse	20.2	21	
Other family members	14.4	15	
Friends/acquaintances	8.7	9	
I do not know	3.9	4	
Armed forces	1.9	2	
Armed group	1.0	1	
No response	1.0	1	
Other	1.0	1	
Recruiter	1.0	1	

# North-east Nigeria

Table 24. Demographic characteristics and displacement profile of the sample, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)		Missing (n)
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper	
Displaced at time of interview	98.7	99.5	12,251	248,438	0.1	99.3	99.7	13
Alive at the time of interview	97.3	98.6	12,086	246,188	0.2	98.3	98.9	0
Died since displacement	2.7	1.4	336	3,405	0.2	1.1	1.7	0
Self-response	13.5	32.5	1,679	81,123	1.1	30.4	34.7	
Proxy-response	86.5	67.5	10,743	168,471	1.1	65.4	69.6	
Sex								0
Female	49.5	49.5	6,150	123,609	0.9	47.7	51.4	
Male	50.5	50.5	6,272	125,984	0.9	48.6	52.3	
Age group								2
Under 5 years	14.7	12.4	1,827	30,987	0.5	11.5	13.4	
5–17 years	37.7	28.4	4,680	70,990	0.7	27.1	29.9	
18–34 years	23.9	28.4	2,966	70,780	0.9	26.6	30.2	
35–49 years	13.9	17.9	1,721	44,651	0.8	16.4	19.5	
50 years and older	9.9	12.9	1,226	32,180	0.8	11.4	14.5	

Table 25. Displacement experiences of primary respondents, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Mean	SD	Missing (n)
Time since displacement (months)	41.7	13.0	918
Time since displacement (years)	3.3	1.1	546
Number of assets			0
Pre-displacement	1.8	1.6	
Post-displacement	1.3	1.3	
	Proportion (%)	Number	Missing (n)
Attacks of armed groups happened in village before displacement	83.0	1,394	1
Household personally affected by attacks	76.8	1,288	0
Received aid before displacement	18.2	305	0
Frequency of attacks on village			0
More than once per month	12.4	173	
Almost every month	38.2	532	
A few times per year	44.8	625	
Once a year	2.4	33	
Once over a few years	2.2	31	
Variable	Mean	SD	Missing (n)
How have you been personally affected by the attacks?			0

Table 25. Displacement experiences of primary respondents, North-east Nigeria (continued)

Damage or destruction of assets	65.5	1,098	
Damage to the house	55.2	925	
Loss of income	44.7	749	
Displacement	12.6	211	
Distress/anxiety/fear	11.7	196	
Physical injuries	8.6	144	
Fear of leaving the house	4.7	78	
Reasons for displacement			0
Armed conflict	89.1	1,496	
Fear of conflict	21.7	365	
Interethnic/communal conflict	18.1	304	
As a result of kidnapping/abductions or to avoid kidnapping/abductions	4.0	67	
Other	3.9	65	
To avoid extortion from armed groups/armed forces	1.7	28	
Economic reasons	1.4	24	
Famine	1.1	19	
As a result of forced labour or to avoid forced labour	1.1	19	
Natural disasters	0.8	13	
Chronic insecurity	0.7	12	
Reasons for coming to current displacement site			0
Safer than other areas	83.6	1,403	
No other choice	20.5	344	
Services are better	17.3	290	
Closer to the residence	15.6	262	
I have friends and family here	14.5	243	
Closer to the markets	3.5	58	
Other	0.2	4	

Table 26. Prevalence of forced labour, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	Confidence limits (%)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper
Living	0.4	0.5	38	1,038	0.2	0.1	0.9
Deceased	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sex							
Males	0.5	0.7	27	736	0.1	0.5	0.9
Females	0.2	0.3	11	302	0.1	0.1	0.4
Children							
Boys	0.4	0.1	10	47	0.1	0.0	0.3
Girls	0.4	0.1	8	26	0.1	0.0	0.2
Age group							
5–17 years	0.4	0.1	18	73	0.0	0.0	0.2
18–34 years	0.2	0.5	5	355	0.1	0.2	0.8
35–49 years	0.7	1.4	11	589	0.3	0.8	1.9
50 years and older	0.4	0.1	4	21	0.1	-0.1	0.2

Table 27. Prevalence of forced recruitment, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper
Living	0.2	0.4	23	853	0.2	0.1	0.7
Deceased	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sex							
Males	0.3	0.7	17	790	0.1	0.5	1.0
Females	0.1	0.1	6	63	0.03	-0.01	0.1
Children							
Boys	0.3	0.2	8	72	0.1	0.0	0.4
Girls	0.1	0.01	2	5	0.0	0.0	0.1
Age group							
5–17 years	0.2	0.1	10	76	0.0	0.0	0.2
18–34 years	0.2	0.3	7	220	0.1	0.1	0.5
35–49 years	0.4	1.3	6	556	0.3	0.7	1.8
50 years and older	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0



Table 28. Prevalence of abduction, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper
Living	1.1	1.2	117	2,517	0.2	0.8	1.6
Deceased	3.3	2.4	7	64	1.2	0.03	4.7
Sex							
Males	1.4	1.4	72	1,459	0.2	1.1	1.7
Females	0.9	1.0	45	1,058	0.1	0.7	1.2
Children							
Boys	1.2	1.4	28	523	0.2	0.9	1.9
Girls	0.7	0.8	16	266	0.2	0.4	1.2
Age group							
5–17 years	1.0	1.1	44	789	0.2	0.8	1.4
18–34 years	1.5	1.8	44	1,265	0.2	1.3	2.3
35–49 years	1.2	0.6	20	271	0.2	0.2	1.0
50 years and older	0.8	0.6	9	192	0.2	0.2	1.1

Table 29. Logistic regression model of predictors of abduction in North-east Nigeria (n = 2,517)

Variable	OR <sup>1</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>	p-value	95% Confidence Interval	
				lower	upper
Sex (Reference: Females)					
Male	1.42	0.51	0.332	0.70	2.88
Age group (Reference: 5– 17 years)					
18–34 years	2.93	1.28	0.014*	1.24	6.90
35–49 years	1.39	0.87	0.596	0.41	4.73
50 and over	1.50	1.36	0.657	0.25	8.92
Relationship to primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Sibling of primary respondent	4.85	3.30	0.02	1.28	18.39
Child of primary respondent	2.33	1.40	0.162	0.71	7.57
Parent of primary respondent	0.26	0.31	0.263	0.02	2.74
Spouse of primary respondent	0.95	0.50	0.917	0.34	2.66
Intercept	0.004	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.02

<sup>1</sup> Odds Ratio<sup>2</sup> Standard Error \*p<0.05

Table 30. Characteristics of forced labour experiences among sampled individuals, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases
<b>How force was exerted</b>		
Forced	76.3	29
Threatened	15.8	6
Other	10.5	4
Deceived	7.9	3
<b>Type of coercion</b>		
Physical violence	26.3	10
Threat of punishment through deprivation of food or other benefits	26.3	10
Deprivation of food, sleep, or other benefits	23.7	9
Threat of violence	23.7	9
Threats against family	13.2	5
Other	13.2	5
Organized by family	5.3	2
Too far from home	5.3	2
Locked up in work or living quarters	2.6	1
Kept under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol	2.6	1
Threat of being locked up in work or living quarters	2.6	1
Threat of sexual violence	2.6	1
<b>Perpetrators of forced labour</b>		
Armed group	47.4	18
Parents	31.6	12
Armed force	13.2	5
Other family members	5.3	2
Recruiter	2.6	1
<b>Activity engaged in</b>		
Domestic labour	23.7	9
Agriculture, forestry	21.1	8
Wholesale and retail trade	15.8	6
Other	13.2	5
Support services to armed groups/forces	10.5	4
Begging	7.9	3
Fighting	7.9	3
Spying	7.9	3
Accommodation	2.6	1
Prostitution/sexual exploitation	2.6	1
Military	2.6	1
Personal service	2.6	1

Table 31. Characteristics of forced recruitment experiences among sampled individuals, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases
<b>How force was exerted</b>		
Forced	65.2	15
Threatened	30.4	7
Other	8.7	2
Deceived	4.4	1
<b>Type of coercion</b>		
Do not know	47.8	11
Physical violence	21.7	5
Threats against family	21.7	5
Threats of violence	13.0	3
Threat of punishment through deprivation of food, sleep, or other benefits	13.0	3
Too far from home and nowhere to go	8.7	2
Locked in work or living quarters	4.4	1
Organized by family/relatives	4.4	1
<b>Activities engaged in</b>		
Do not know	52.2	12
Fighting	26.1	6
Other	13.0	3
Spying	13.0	3
Domestic labour	8.7	2
Agriculture, forestry	4.3	1

Table 32. Characteristics of abductions, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)		Number of cases		Standard Error (%)	95% confidence limits (%)		Missing (n)
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted		lower	upper	
Perpetrators of abduction								0
Armed groups	88.7	87.5	110	2,258	6.5	68.2	95.8	
Unknown	4.8	2.0	6	51	1.1	0.7	5.8	
Armed forces	4.0	10.1	5	261	6.5	2.7	31.8	
Other	2.4	0.4	3	10	0.3	0.1	1.6	
Taken to a location within Nigeria								1
Yes	55.3	61.0	68	1,573	8.8	42.9	76.5	
Unknown	39.0	32.5	48	839	8.8	17.9	51.6	
No	5.7	6.5	7	167	3.0	2.6	15.4	
State in Nigeria taken to								1
Borno	94.0	98.6	63	1,487	1.3	91.7	99.8	
Adamawa	3.0	1.3	2	20	1.3	0.2	8.8	
Yobe	3.0	0.1	2	2	0.1	0.0	0.4	
Have you kept some contact with them after the disappearance?								0
No	92.9	95.32	104	1,740	3.2	83.4	98.8	
Yes, once	3.6	0.43	4	8	0.2	0.1	1.3	
Yes, occasionally	1.8	1.07	2	20	1.1	0.2	7.2	
Yes, on a regular basis	1.8	3.18	2	58	3.0	0.5	18.2	
Experienced forced labour in the past five years (aged 5 and over and still living)	7.69	15.2	9	382	9.1	4.2	42.2	
Experienced forced recruitment in the past five years (aged 5 and over and still living)	11.97	2.1	14	38	2.1	2.0	0.3	

Table 33. Characteristics of recruitment of child soldiers, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Sex			0
Males	38	3	
Females	63	5	
How force was exerted			0
Taken by force	88	7	
Threats	13	1	
Still with the armed group/ force? (among those still living)			0
Unknown	13	1	
Yes	88	7	
Activities engaged in			0
Agriculture and forestry	13	1	
Unknown	75	6	
Other	13	1	

Table 34. Characteristics of forced marriage, North-east Nigeria

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Sex			0
Female	80.0	35	
Male	20.0	9	
Age at marriage			3
Aged under 15 years	41.5		
Aged under 18 years	61.0		
Average age at marriage			NA
Female	17	NA	
Male	21	NA	
Who forced them to marry?			3
Parents	53.7	22	
Spouse	2.4	1	
Other family member	14.6	6	
Armed group	24.4	10	
Armed force	4.9	2	

## North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Table 35. Demographic characteristics and displacement profile of the sample, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Displaced at time of interview	73.6	11,206	0
Alive at the time of interview	79.9	12,153	0
Died since displacement	20.1	3,065	0
Self-responses	13.4	2,043	0
Proxy-responses	86.6	13,192	0
Sex			0
Female	50.2		
Male	49.8		
Age group			0
Under 5 years	7.6	1,154	
5–17 years	27.5	4,178	
18–34 years	24.0	3,647	
35–49 years	15.6	2,367	
50 years and older	25.4	3,872	

Table 36. Displacement experiences of primary respondents, North Kivu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Mean	SD	Missing (n)
Time since displacement (months since displacement)	35.3	24.5	875
Time since displacement (years since displacement)	3.1	2.3	168
	%	Number	Missing (n)
Attacks of armed groups happened in village before displacement	86.8	1,758	0
Household personally affected by attacks	98.2	1,724	2
Received aid before displacement	7.4	151	
Frequency of attacks			0
More than once per month	43.6	767	
Almost every month	39.0	685	
A few times per year	14.5	254	
Once a year	1.9	33	
Once over a few years	1.1	19	
Consequences of attacks			0
Damage or destruction of assets	72.9	1,256	
Damage to the house	29.9	516	
Physical injuries	24.9	430	
Distress/anxiety/fear	19.8	341	
Variable	Mean	SD	Missing (n)
Loss of income	14.2	245	
Fear of leaving the house	3.1	53	
Reason for displacement			0
Armed conflicts	89.3	1,824	
Fear of conflict	23.2	473	
Economic considerations	18.0	367	
Chronic insecurity	9.7	198	
Inter-ethnic conflicts	8.4	171	
Kidnappings/abductions	1.1	23	
Forced labour	1.1	22	
Other	1.0	21	
Extortion	0.8	17	
Famine	0.4	8	
Reasons for coming to current displacement site			0
Safer than other areas	46.0	939	
No other choice	44.4	908	
Closer to the residence	26.7	546	
I have friends and family here	10.6	217	
Services are better	6.9	141	
Closer to the markets	5.3	108	
Other	1.8	36	

Table 37. Proportion of the sample that experienced forced labour during the reference period, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases
Living	14.5	1,349
Deceased	8.6	59
Sex		
Males	19.0	814
Females	10.7	535
Children		
Boys	2.3	41
Girls	2.4	42
Age group		
5–17 years	2.4	83
18–34 years	22.4	574
35–49 years	26.3	414
50 years and older	17.0	278

Table 38. Proportion of the sample that experienced forced recruitment during the reference period, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases
Living	2.3	217
Deceased	3.3	23
Sex		
Males	4.7	202
Females	0.3	15
Children		
Boys	0.6	11
Girls	0.0	0
Age group		
5–17 years	0.3	11
18–34 years	5.0	129
35–49 years	3.7	58
50 years and older	1.2	19



Table 39. Proportion of the sample that were abducted during the reference period, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases
Living	10.9	1,011
Deceased	14.2	98
Sex		
Males	13.3	571
Females	8.8	440
Children		
Boys	1.3	23
Girls	2.4	43
Age group		
5–17 years	1.9	66
18–34 years	17.6	450
35–49 years	19.5	306
50 years and older	11.5	189

Table 40. Logistic regression model of predictors of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abduction in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

	OR <sup>1</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>	p-value	95% Confidence Interval	
				lower	upper
Dependent variable: Forced labour (n = 9,447)					
Sex (Reference: Female)					
Male	3.35	0.25	<0.001*	2.89	3.88
Age group (Reference: 5– 17 years)					
18 –34 years	4.88	0.77	<0.001*	3.59	6.64
35–49 years	4.53	0.76	<0.001*	3.25	6.31
50 years and older	2.75	0.49	<0.001*	1.93	3.91
No aid received	0.98	0.12	0.879	0.78	1.24
Number of persons residing in the household	1.01	0.02	0.466	0.98	1.05
Had assets prior to displacement	1.66	0.14	<0.001*	1.40	1.97
Village was attacked prior to displacement	1.47	0.16	<0.001*	1.19	1.81
Relationship to the primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Spouse/partner	0.13	0.02	<0.001*	0.10	0.17
Child	0.15	0.02	<0.001*	0.12	0.19
Parent	0.45	0.04	<0.001*	0.38	0.54
Sibling	0.18	0.03	<0.001*	0.14	0.24
Intercept	0.05	0.01	0.000	0.03	0.08
Dependent variable: Forced recruitment into armed groups or forces (n = 9,447)					
Sex (Reference: Female)					

Table 40. Logistic regression model of predictors of forced labour, forced recruitment into armed groups or forces, and abduction, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (continued)

	OR <sup>1</sup>	SE <sup>2</sup>	p-value	95% Confidence Interval	
				lower	upper
Male	25.18	7.18	<0.001*	14.40	44.03
Age group (Reference: 5–17 years)					
18–34 years	9.62	3.42	<0.001*	4.79	19.32
35–49 years	5.54	2.10	<0.001*	2.63	11.65
50 years and older	1.77	0.77	0.191	0.75	4.17
No aid received	0.94	0.24	0.799	0.57	1.54
Number of persons residing in the household	0.85	0.03	<0.001*	0.79	0.92
Had assets prior to displacement	1.68	0.29	0.003*	1.20	2.37
Village was attacked prior to displacement	2.22	0.61	0.004*	1.29	3.81
Relationship to the primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Spouse/partner	0.30	0.08	<0.001*	0.18	0.50
Child	0.83	0.17	0.37	0.55	1.24
Parent	0.74	0.14	0.1	0.51	1.06
Sibling	0.17	0.10	0.003*	0.05	0.55
Intercept	0.001	0.00	0.000	0.00	0.002
Dependent variable: Abduction (n = 9,447)					
Sex (Reference: Female)					
Male	2.02	0.15	<0.001*	1.74	2.34
Age group (Reference: 5–17 years)					
18–34 years	4.57	0.73	<0.001*	3.34	6.24
35–49 years	4.28	0.74	<0.001*	3.06	6.00
50 years and older	2.61	0.48	<0.001*	1.82	3.74
No aid received	1.73	0.26	<0.001*	1.29	2.32
Number of persons residing in the household	0.93	0.02	<0.001*	0.90	1.00
Had assets prior to displacement	1.20	0.11	0.049*	1.001	1.44
Village was attacked prior to displacement	1.43	0.16	0.001*	1.15	1.78
Relationship to the primary respondent (Reference: Self)					
Spouse/partner	0.28	0.04	<0.001*	0.21	0.37
Child	0.52	0.06	<0.001*	0.42	0.64
Parent	0.85	0.08	0.074	0.71	1.02
Sibling	0.43	0.06	<0.001*	0.32	0.57
Intercept	0.03	0.01	0.000	0.02	0.05

<sup>1</sup> Odds Ratio <sup>2</sup> Standard Error \*p<0.05

Table 41. Characteristics of forced labour, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
<b>How force was exerted</b>			
Taken by force	90.1	1,280	
Threatened	54.1	769	
Deceived	5.4	76	
Other	0.4	6	
<b>Location when forced labour commenced</b>			
In this displacement site	52.3	739	7
In their village of origin	43.4	613	
In another displacement site	2.1	30	
Somewhere else in the country	2.1	29	
Unknown	0.2	3	
<b>Type of coercion</b>			
Physical violence	70.3	995	6
Threats of violence	17.6	249	
Sexual violence	5.7	81	
Deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	1.6	23	
Threats against family	1.6	22	
Wages withheld	1.2	17	
Punished through fine/financial penalty	0.6	8	
Had to repay debt	0.4	6	
Locked in work or living quarters	0.4	6	
Too far from home and nowhere to go	0.4	6	
Family	0.1	1	
Withheld passport or other documents	0.1	1	
<b>Perpetrators of forced labour</b>			
Armed group	82.3	1,169	1
Armed forces	7.7	109	
Employer	3.0	43	
Other	2.1	30	
Unknown	1.3	19	
Recruiter	1.3	19	
Friends/acquaintances	1.1	16	
Parents	0.5	7	
Other family members	0.5	7	
Spouse	0.1	1	
<b>Activities engaged in</b>			
Portering	68.9	979	0

Table 41. Characteristics of forced labour, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (continued)

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	25.3	360	
Support services to armed forces	22.0	312	
Prostitution/Sexual exploitation	16.2	230	
Construction	15.6	221	
Domestic labour	8.1	115	
Fighting	6.0	85	
Manufacturing	2.4	34	
Spying	1.4	20	
Accommodation and food services	0.6	9	
Personal Services	0.2	3	
Begging	0.1	2	
Wholesale and retail trade	0.1	1	
Taken somewhere else to work			6
No	79.0	1,118	
Yes	15.6	221	
Unknown	5.4	76	

Table 42. Characteristics of forced recruitment, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
How force was exerted			0
Taken by force	91.0	223	
Threats	65.3	160	
Deception	5.3	13	
Type of coercion			0
Physical violence	63.3	155	
Threats of violence	26.9	66	
Threats to the family	5.3	13	
Locked up in the workplace or in living quarters	2.0	5	
Sexual violence	0.8	2	
Punished by deprivation of food, sleep, or other benefits	0.8	2	
Unpaid wages	0.4	1	
Other	0.4	1	
Activities engaged in			0
Fighting	71.0	169	
Portering	44.1	105	
Support services	43.7	104	
Spying	16.8	40	
Construction	14.3	34	
Agriculture	6.3	15	
Domestic labour	6.3	15	
Drug production	0.8	2	
Sexual services	0.8	2	
Manufacturing	0.8	2	
Begging	0.4	1	
Personal services	0.4	1	
Mining	0.4	1	

Table 43. Characteristics of abductions, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Perpetrators of abduction			0
Armed groups	80.9	910	
Criminal/smuggler groups	7.9	89	
Unknown	6.8	76	
Armed forces	2.4	27	
Other	1.5	17	
Recruiter	0.4	4	
Employer	0.2	2	
Taken to a location in the Democratic Republic of the Congo			0
Yes	91.1	1,026	
Unknown	8.8	99	
No	0.1	1	
Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo taken to			0
North Kivu	99.1	1,265	
South Kivu	0.4	5	
Haut-Katanga	0.1	1	
Kasaï	0.1	1	
Kinshasa	0.1	1	
Tanganyika	0.1	1	
Tshopo	0.1	1	
Équateur	0.1	1	
Were you able to keep in touch with them after they were abducted?			0
No	85.9	965	
Yes, occasionally	6.2	70	
Yes, once or rarely	4.2	47	
Yes, regularly	3.7	42	
Also experienced forced labour in the past five years (aged 5 and over and still living)	44.3	447	
Also experienced force recruitment in the past five years (aged 5 and over and still living)	10.6	107	

Table 44. Characteristics of recruitment of child soldiers, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number of cases	Missing (n)
Sex			0
Males	94.0	47	
Females	6.0	3	
How force was exerted			0
Taken by force	8.0	4	
Threats	88.0	44	
Deception	58.0	29	
Type of coercion			0
Physical violence	68.0	34	
Threats of violence	28.0	14	
Locked up in the workplace or in living quarters	2.0	1	
Other	2.0	1	
Living at the time of interview			0
No	12.0	6	
Yes	88.0	44	
Are those taken as children still with the armed group/force?			0
No	81.8	27	
Yes	18.2	6	
Activity engaged in			0
Fighting and military service	76.0	38	
Support service	48.0	24	
Portering	46.0	23	
Construction	12.0	6	
Spying	12.0	6	
Domestic labour	10.0	5	
Agriculture	2.0	1	
Personal services	2.0	1	

Table 45. Characteristics of forced marriage, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable	Proportion (%)	Number	Missing (n)
Sex			0
Female	85.6	89	
Male	14.4	15	
Age at marriage			0
Aged under 15 years	12.5	13	
Aged under 16 years	32.7	34	
Aged under 18 years	55.8	58	
Type of coercion			0
Threat of punishment through deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	27.9	29	
Pressured by family/relatives	22.1	23	
Physical violence	16.4	17	
Punished through fine/financial penalty	12.5	13	
Organized by family/relatives	12.5	13	
Threats against family	5.8	6	
Punished by deprivation of food, sleep, other benefits	1.9	2	
Sexual violence	1.0	1	
Perpetrators of forced marriage			0
Parents	47.1	49	
Spouse	20.2	21	
Other family members	14.4	15	
Friends/acquaintances	8.7	9	
Unknown	3.9	4	
Armed forces	1.9	2	
Armed group	1.0	1	
No response	1.0	1	
Other	1.0	1	
Recruiter	1.0	1	



## Endnotes\*

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